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Sec. 2

HISTORY OF AFHQ

PART THREE

DECEMBER 1943 — JULY 1944

SECTION 2



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allied forces.

HISTORY OF
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AND
HEADQUARTERS NATOUSA

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PART III

PERIOD OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

FROM THE WINTER LINE TO ROME

(1 December 1943 to 30 June 1944)

Section 2

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Chapter XXII

REORGANIZATION OF AFHQ IN EARLY 1944

The two principal changes in the organizations of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA in the period between 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944 were (1) a complete reorganization of Hq NATOUSA, which distributed many of its staff functions to American components in AFHQ and to staff sections in Hq SOS NATOUSA, and (2) the plans and preparations for the move of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA from ALGIERS to CASERTA. The actual move, however, took place in July 1944, one month after the period treated in this part of the history. The details of these changes as well as of other minor ones are treated in detail in the following sections of this chapter. ✓

1. Chiefs of Staff. AFHQ and NATOUSA

Major General Walter B. Smith (A) continued to serve¹ as Chief of Staff of AFHQ until 8 January 1944. Lieutenant General J.A.H. Gammell (B) succeeded Major General Smith on that date.²

Brigadier General Elbert L. Ford (A) continued as³ Chief of Staff of NATOUSA until 3 February 1944. He⁴ was succeeded by Brigadier General David G. Barr (A).

Daily AFHQ Chief of Staff Conferences, as described in Part II, continued to be held throughout the period

-
1. AFHQ GO No 18, 14 Feb 43.
 2. AFHQ GO No 2, 8 Jan 44.
 3. NATOUSA GC No 7, 3 Feb 44, sect I.
 4. Ibid.

ending with 30 June 1944.

2. Deputy Chiefs of Staff. AFHQ and NATOUSA

Major General J. F. M. Whiteley (B) continued to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff AFHQ until 26 January 1944. He was especially charged with the co-ordination⁶ of G-2 and G-3 matters. With the reversal in nationality of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, and the Chief of Staff AFHQ, a similar reversal occurred with the Deputy Chief of Staff AFHQ. Major General Whiteley was succeeded by Major General Lowell W. Rooks (A), who also took over the special responsibility for⁷ co-ordinating G-2 and G-3 matters.

Lieutenant General Sir Humphrey M. Gale (B), the Chief Administrative Officer of AFHQ, was in practice a Deputy Chief of Staff with the special responsibility of supervising and co-ordinating G-1 and G-4 matters. He⁸ held both responsibilities until 29 January 1944 when Lieutenant General J. G. W. Clark (B) succeeded him in⁹ both capacities. General Clark was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general upon receiving the assignment¹⁰ of CAO.

Brigadier General Elbert L. Ford (A) was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff NATOUSA on 3 February 1944 and

5. AFHQ Organizational Charts, 10 Nov 43, par 20. For its composition see History of AFHQ, II, 224.

6. AFHQ Cable No W6285, AFHQ to WD, 1 Aug 43.

7. AFHQ GO No 6, 26 Jan 44.

8. AFHQ Cable No 6285, AFHQ to WD, 1 Aug 43. Memo, Lt Col Dalton to Lt Col Johnston, 11 Aug 43 (Log Plans AFHQ file: Log P 58). AFHQ Organizational Charts, 10 Nov 43, par 9.

9. AFHQ GO No 7, 29 Jan 44.

10. CAO AFHQ file: CAO 1003, part II, Orders (Officers) issued by Camp Commandant AFHQ, Ref CC/43/2, 2 Feb 44.

continued in that capacity until 12 April 1944.¹¹ Colonel George D. Pence was designated Deputy Chief of Staff¹² NATOUA on 8 June 1944.

3. Secretary. General Staff

a. The Secretary. General Staff. On 2 January 1944 Colonel Dan Gilmer (A), Secretary, General Staff, was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Bastion,¹³ Jr. (A).

b. Changes in Functions. The functions of the Secretary, General Staff remained the same as in 1943 with only minor modifications in the first half of¹⁴ 1944. These changes in fact consisted entirely of the discontinuance of the functions of the Statistical Subsection. Thus the Office of the Secretary, General Staff was no longer responsible for obtaining and maintaining over-all statistics or for preparing charts and¹⁵ maps for the use of the SAC, the CofS, and the DCofS.

c. Reorganization of the Office of Secretary. General Staff. In December 1943 the Statistical Subsection was dissolved, and its functions were later transferred to a new Analysis and Control Section under the Office¹⁶ of the Chief of Staff NATOUA. On the other hand a

11. NATOUA GO No 7, 3 Feb 44, sect II. NATOUA ltr order, 12 Apr 44.

12. NATOUA GO No 50, 8 June 44, sect I.

13. AFHQ Staff Memo No 2, 8 Jan 44.

14. See History of AFHQ, II, 226-229.

15. Draft History of SGS AFHQ, p 7.

16. Ibid.

new Interservice and Political Secretariat (IS & PS) was established as an adjunct to the Office of SGS in April 17 1944. The organization of the Office of Secretary, General Staff in April 1944, with the changes mentioned above, is shown in the chart on the next page.

d. Changes in Personnel. A comparison of authorized personnel strength for the offices of the Chief of Staff (B), the Deputy Chief of Staff (A), and Secretary, General Staff (including IS and PS) between November 1943 and June 1944 is shown in the table below.

<u>OFFICERS</u>					<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>				
Rank	Am		Br		Rank	Am		Br	
	Nov 43*	Apr 44#	Dec 43x	June 44@		Nov 43*	Apr 44#	Dec 43x	Mar 44@
Gen & Col	3	3	2	3	M/Sgt	2	2		1
Lt Col	4	3	1	1	T/Sgt	8	8		1
Maj	8	4	3	3	S/Sgt	13	10		
Capt	7	7	1	2	Tec 3	5	5		
1st Lt	3	3			Sgt	9	7		4
2nd Lt		1			Tec 4	29	34		
Totals:	25	21	7	9	Cpl	6	3	2	8
					Tec 5	17	17		
					Pfc	4	3		
					Pvt		2		10

WARRANT OFFICERS

GWO		2
WOJG	5	2

Totals: 5 4 93 91 2 24

1943 1944

Total Americans: 123 116
Total British: 10 33

COMBINED TOTALS: 133 149

17. AFHQ Staff Memo No 39, 9 Apr 44.

* CofS and SGS T/O of 28 June 43 (AC NATOUSA file: 200.3.130).


AG NATOUSA Memo 221.02-440 A-O, 11 Apr 44.


x WE XII/1/4, wef 1 Dec 43.

@ WE NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF, AFHQ
April 1944



LEGEND:
 (A), (B) Indicate an entirely American or British subsection.
 (a) Indicates a combined subsection with an American as head.
 Subdivision discontinued in December 1943.

e. Interservice and Political Secretariat (IS and PS). On 12 April 1944, the IS and PS was set up as an adjunct of SGS to insure prompt and co-ordinated action on policy matters in which naval, military, air, and political questions were interrelated. The functions of the Secretariat were:

(1) To insure that joint consultations between those responsible for reaching decisions on the policy matters mentioned above were arranged; that the necessary agenda for such consultations were prepared; and that the decisions reached were recorded and translated into executive action by appropriate staff sections of AFHQ, the Hq C-in-C Mediterranean, or the Hq MAAF, or by the staffs of the British or American political advisors.

(2) To carry out the secretarial duties required for the SAC's conferences and political conferences with his political advisors.

(3) To be the channel through which instructions will be sent to the Joint Planning Staff and Joint Intelligence Committee when
18
necessary.

Colonel J.H. Lascelles (B) and Mr. J.M. Addis (B)
19
were appointed members of IS and PS.

18. AFHQ Staff Memo No 39, 9 Apr 44.

19. Col J. O. Kilgore (A) was originally appointed American member of IS and PS but left after a short period. AFHQ Staff Memo No 42, 18 Apr 44, sect I, superseded by AFHQ Staff Memo No 53, 28 May 44, sect I.

4. American Headquarters Reorganization in NATOUSA

In approaching the complex discussion of the reorganization of the American higher-echelon headquarters in the North African (Mediterranean) Theater of Operations, one should have a clear understanding of their chief differences in 1943. Those differences were briefly stated by General Sawbridge, ACoS G-1 NATOUSA, in a memorandum mentioning

- (1) A separate Headquarters NATOUSA.
- (2) A separate Allied Force Headquarters with a Chief of Staff (A) administering combat echelons.
- (3) A Deputy Theater Commander (A) administering Communications Zone (A) commands.
- (4) A Headquarters Services of Supply (A) co-ordinating supply matters and logistical plans with the Zone of Interior (A).

In addition to supplies Hq SOS NATOUSA, through its base sections, also provided administration for local American units in rear areas and the US Army's share in the defense of local rear areas. At the same time on a still higher level of American command Hq NATOUSA, through its staff components in the combined American and British staff sections of AFHQ and through its separate purely American staff sections, participated in the direction of combat operations and the development of strategic plans as well as the definition of general policies for

20. Memo, Gen Sawbridge to CofS NATOUSA, subjects "Conservation of Manpower . . .," 8 July 44 (G-1 MTOUSA file: T/O Hq MTOUSA).

American supply and administration which were to be followed by Hq Com Z and Hq SOS NATOUSA. Actually, of the four headquarters mentioned above by General Sawbridge, only three existed (AFHQ, Hq NATOUSA, and Hq SOS NATOUSA), since the CG Com Z utilized the staff and staff sections of Hq NATOUSA.

Such a triangular headquarters establishment hindered efficient staff action and militated against an economical use of headquarters personnel. This situation was felt keenly by the War Department, particularly when it was compelled to consider personnel demands for future operations in ITALY, in northern and southern FRANCE, and in the PACIFIC. Consequently it dispatched a group of seven officers under the Inspector General's direction to conduct "a survey pertaining to the organization, administration, supply, and procedures within the North African and European Theaters of Operations"²¹ Between 4 June and 20 July 1943, the Inspector General reported,

conferences were held with the two theater commanders and with a large number of principal subordinate commanders and staff officers, both British and American, and visits were made to the major installations and activities in both theaters.²²

Two important conclusions in the survey group's memorandum of 6 August 1943 was "that non-T/O overhead for service installations is excessive in both theaters, and that such overhead should be more carefully regulated." To these conclusions the Inspector General added

21. Memo, IG (WD) to DCofS (WD), 6 Aug 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 333.1-181).

22. Ibid.

his own recommendations:

That a maximum figure for non-T/O overhead personnel, such as not to exceed 1 overhead to 50 field workers, be adopted for the Army as a whole, and that there be specified an allowance of ranks, grades, and ratings for such overhead, depending upon the actual number of troops (25,000, 50,000, etc.) over which there is exercised command or supervisory control.²³

This survey report and its conclusions inspired a renewed effort to reorganize the various American headquarters, and this effort led to such a reorganization in the North African Theater during February 1944. The discussions held and the studies made in the interim throw light on the problem and lend significance to the result. Only the principal plans will be mentioned in treating the preliminary stages of the reorganization.

In the period from August 1943 to February 1944 two general views for reorganizing the three headquarters were put forward. For brevity and convenience these views may be labelled pro-AFHQ and pro-Hq NATOUSA. Supporters of the former view desired the abolition of Hq NATOUSA and the use of the American components in AFHQ for direct command and administration of both American combat and communication zone units in the Theater. Defenders of the latter view wanted the continuance of Hq NATOUSA as a headquarters separate from AFHQ with an American Chief of Staff at AFHQ administering American combat echelons, an American Deputy Theater Commander in Hq NATOUSA administering commands of the American Communications Zone, and an American Hq Services of Supply co-ordinating supply matters and logistical plans with

23. Ibid.

the American Zone of Interior.

Although both views had the dual object of reduction in personnel and elimination of duplication of functions,

25

the several sponsors of each view differed

among themselves in the course of the controversy on the best means to attain these results. Moreover, this failure to present a united front on either side was re-

flected in the attitude of certain general officers, both American and British, some of whom reversed their original positions on certain particulars to join what hith-

26

erto had been for them the opposition. Another, though temporary, element of complication was that the earlier phases of the planning had included consideration of

an imminent move of AFHQ to ITALY; but since, as the

27

event proved, this move was not made until July 1944,

28

24. For references to the above conflicting views see footnotes 20 (above) and 35 and 47 (below). It should be noted that under the US Army organization and system of staff procedure the operation of supply services is a function of subordinate headquarters, i.e., control and operation of supply services are decentralized and are not managed by senior headquarters. On this point see NATOUSA memos, DTC NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA, 4 and 6 Nov 43 (CofS NATOUSA file: 322).

25. After the Crane Committee, appointed independently for another but allied purpose, had on 28 Sep 43 submitted its report with its 61 organizational charts of commands and staff organizations of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA, these charts proved to be of invaluable assistance to the planners. For a detailed account of this committee and its work see History of AFHQ, II, 221-222.

26. The spirit of compromise was not without value, however, because it advanced the preliminary process of reorganization. According to available records the general officers supporting the pro-AFHQ view totalled six (two American and four British) and those defending the pro-Hq NATOUSA view numbered five (all Americans), of whom one later opposed any reorganization and another joined the pro-AFHQ group.

27. On 29 Dec 43 Gen Marshall cabled to the CofS AFHQ that there would be no move of AFHQ for the time being. (Cable No 5947, WD to AFHQ, 29 Dec 43.)

28. See History of AFHQ, pt III, (ch XXII, Sect 9).

it ceased to be a factor in the later stages of discussions on reorganization.

While all holders of the pro-AFHQ view favored the abolition of Hq NATOUSA, they differed among themselves and encountered opposition from others on subsidiary matters, such as the continuation and expansion of Com Z, the reorganization of Hq SOS, the number and type of American general and special staff sections to be retained in AFHQ, and the supply and maintenance of the American 5th Army.

The plan first presented to support the pro-AFHQ
29
view (proposed by General Davis (A), AG AFHQ) had the advantage of attracting more adherents to one or another of its points than subsequent pro-AFHQ plans were to acquire. This Davis plan of 8 August 1943 offered the

30
following solution:

a. To designate Allied Force Headquarters as "General Headquarters, Allied Forces" or "Allied Forces, General Headquarters" and thereby to provide for AFHQ the status of a general headquarters.

b. To retain in toto the present AFHQ general and special staff organization save for minor changes.

c. To continue and to expend the present
31
Com Z, that it might meet anticipated for-

29. Described in text at footnote 24 above.

30. Memo, Gen Davis to CofS AFHQ, 8 Aug 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 320.2-2).

31. Established on 15 Feb 43 by NATOUSA GO No 4, 12 Feb 43.

ward movements of our operations, and to fix Com Z's forward boundary as far forward as might be practicable.

d. To reorganize the present American
32 SOS and thus to provide complete co-ordina-
33 tion with the British L of C.

e. To let the British L of C retain its present organization and to provide closer co-operation with Hq SOS in joint efforts.

f. To locate Hq SOS at the largest port nearest AFHQ and to reorganize it along American staff organizational lines with American personnel exclusively, except for British liaison officers on joint boards and special groups dealing with pooled facilities.

g. To put active base sections and other American installations in NORTH AFRICA under a Deputy Commander SOS as a rear echelon with headquarters in NORTH AFRICA. ✓

h. To have the CG SOS from his GHQ administer base sections and all other American supply, transport, and administrative activities forward of NORTH AFRICA in Com Z. ✓

General Davis believed that the following major advantages
34 would result from his plan:

a. It would produce an organization more or less parallel to the present British GHQ setup and thereby (would) eliminate con-

32. Established on 15 Feb 43 by NATOUSA GO No 6, 14 Feb 43.

33. For AFHQ's relations with various parts of L of C during 1943 see History of AFHQ, II, 175-183.

34. Reference cited in footnote 30 above.

siderable confusion, but would retain the main features of our own (American) organizational practices and procedures.

b. It would centralize the control of, and fix the responsibility for, US SOS activities and functions³⁵ under the Commander-in-Chief (of Allied Forces) without hampering the C-in-C (AF) in his functions as Theater (NATOUSA) and Allied Force Commander.

c. It would eliminate dual Theater (Hq NATOUSA) and (Hq) SOS staffs. The Theater (Hq NATOUSA) staff would be washed out completely, placing on the US side of general and special staff sections of Allied Forces the responsibility for the development and general supervision of policies affecting US activities in this Theater... .

Such was the principal plan of the pro-AFHQ group, together with some of its advantages. No matter how divergently the later exponents of this view differed from one another in minor details, they maintained in common that Hq NATOUSA should be abolished. Full or partial concurrence with General Davis's suggestions came from the following general officers:

(1) Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey M.

Gale (B), CAO AFHQ, who was in entire agreement and preferred "the proposal that the link (Hq NATOUSA) between AFHQ and the SOS should be abolished."³⁶

(2) Major General J.F.M. Whiteley (B), DCofS

³⁷
AFHQ, who made some modifications and succeeded

35. Most of the pro-AFHQ planners were concerned especially with the subject of supply. See Gen Whiteley's (DCofS AFHQ) draft (undated) and his CRS of 16 Oct 43, Gen Robertson's (DCAO FLAMBO) note of 21 Dec 43, and Gen Rock's (ACofS G-3 AFHQ) memo of 3 Jan 44, cited respectively in footnotes 37, 38, 41 and 42 below.

36. From IRS, 22 Aug 43, attached to Gen Davis's memo (reference cited in footnote 30 above).

37. Draft, subject: "organization of AF when AFHQ moves to ITALY" (CofS MTOUSA file: 322). No date of draft is given on copy attached to memo, Gen Hughes to Gen Whiteley, 11 Oct 43 (CofS MTOUSA file: 322).

in having his plan, after amendment, temporarily
 adopted by the Allied Com-C "as a basis for planning
 for the period following the move of AFHQ to ITALY."

(3) Major General Sir Brian H. Robertson (B),
 DCAO FLAMBO, who believed that "the changes...offer a
 splendid opportunity to do away with the absurd parallel
 system of administration represented by (Hq) NATOUSA."

(4) Major General Lowell W. Rooks (A), ACofS G-3
 AFHQ, who recommended that "the US Theater Hq (NATOUSA)
 as now organized be dissolved and that a complete US
 general and special staff be incorporated in AFHQ, inte-
 grated to the extent practicable, which will serve in
 the dual capacity as part of AFHQ and as the US Theater
 (Hq NATOUSA) staff" and that "there be set up a complete
 Com Z Hq by combining the present Hq NATOUSA (except
 G-1) and the Hq SOS."

38. Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes (A), DTC NATOUSA and CG
 Com Z NATOUSA, and Brig Gen Elbert L. Ford (A), CofS NATOUSA,
 offered strong opposition to some of Gen Whiteley's suggestions,
 several of which Gen Whiteley later either altered or withdrew.
 Memo, Gen Hughes to Gen Whiteley, 11 Oct 43 (CofS MTOUSA file:
 322); AFHQ Co-ordinating Route Slip, Staff Minute Sheet, subject:
 "Organization of AF when AFHQ moves to ITALY," DCofS to DTC,
 16 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ file); NATOUSA memo, Gen Ford to Gen Whiteley,
 18 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ file); NATOUSA memo, DTC to CofS AFHQ,
 23 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ file).

39. As the event proved, because this plan was permitted
 to lapse.

40. AFHQ memo, DCofS to CAO, DTC, G-1 (B), G-2, G-3,
 G-4, 19 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ file); and AFHQ memo SGS to CAO, DTC,
 G-1 (B), G-2, G-3, G-4, 29 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ file).

41. Note, Gen Robertson to Gen Whiteley, 21 Dec 43
 (SGS AFHQ file; 201 Whiteley).

42. Memo, Gen Rooks to CofS AFHQ, 3 Jan 44 (CofS
 MTOUSA file: 322).

(5) Major General R.G. Lewis (B), DCMG AFHQ, who accepted General Rooks's recommendations as the solution "to achieve simplicity and economy" in "the existing organization for command and administration of the American side of NATOUSA."⁴³

The suggestion submitted by the proponents of the pro-Hq NATOUSA view were varied, but were united in their main recommendation of a smaller American representation in AFHQ and particularly of the continuance of Hq NATOUSA. The principal plans proposed the transfer of either all or some American special staff sections from AFHQ to Hq NATOUSA or to Hq SOS, discussed especially the future responsibilities of the G-4 Section,⁴⁴ considered the command of Com Z, and criticized several points raised by exponents of the pro-AFHQ view.

The simplest proposal seems to have been also the earliest on record as well as the foundation upon which were based the later plans of members of the pro-Hq NATOUSA group. In discussing allotted strengths of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA, a subject related to reorganization and reserved for treatment later in this chapter,⁴⁵ General Sawbridge (A), ACof S G-1 NATOUSA,

43. Memo, Gens Gale and Lewis to CofS AFHQ, 4 Jan 44 (CofS MTOUSA file: 322). With Gen Lewis also concurred Gens Gale (*ibid.*) and Whiteley, the latter of whom shrewdly stated that "there is, and always has been, a fundamental difference of opinion on Theater reorganization between AFHQ and (Hq) NATOUSA," and indorsed Gen Rooks's view "without reservation." See memo, Gen Whiteley to CofS AFHQ, undated but of this period (CofS MTOUSA file: 322).

44. The British component of AFHQ comprised on the side of supply the functions corresponding with those of the American Hq SOS.

45. See Sect 8 below.

proposed on 4 October 1943 two practicable solutions:

a. (Either) to make AFHQ a strategic headquarters insofar as American personnel was concerned and to transfer completely to Hq NATOUSA the American component of G-4 AFHQ and all American special staff sections.

b. (Or) to continue AFHQ as at present but to reduce G-4 AFHQ and the American special services to the minimum necessary for planning, transferring all other American personnel and operating functions (American) to Hq NATOUSA.

These recommendations emphasized the problem of supply, which appears to have loomed large in the discussion of reorganization,⁴⁷ and pointed the way for a variety of suggestions from the pro-Hq NATOUSA party.

Brigadier General Elbert L. Ford (A), CofS NATOUSA, convinced that "when and if AFHQ moves to a new location, changes will be necessary in the organization of Hq NATOUSA to meet the new conditions," on 5 October 1943 directed the general staff sections of Hq NATOUSA to prepare under the co-ordination of its G-1 Section recommendations for the necessary reorganization and to present these to the DTC⁴⁸ NATOUSA "at the earliest practicable date."

46. Memo, ACofS G-1 NATOUSA to DTC, 4 Oct 43 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/C Hq NATOUSA). Later, however, Gen Sawbridge considered "the present setup most efficient" and recommended "no change as long as AFHQ and (Hq) NATOUSA are together." This reversal of opinion was in his memo to CG NATOUSA, 12 Jan 44 (G-1 NATOUSA file: Theater T/O Policy).

47. All the pro-Hq NATOUSA planners were concerned particularly with this subject. See NATOUSA memos (all in CofS MTOUSA file: 322): (1) Gen Ford (CofS NATOUSA) to CG NATOUSA, 4 and 6 Nov 43; (3) Gen Larkin (CG SOS NATOUSA) to Gen Hughes, 14 Nov 43; (4) Gen Adcock (ACofS G-4 AFHQ) to CofS AFHQ, 15 Dec 43.

48. NATOUSA memo, CofS NATOUSA to GS sects NATOUSA, 5 Oct 43 (CofS MTOUSA file: 322). Repeated efforts to discover this study resulted in failure during 1945 when general doubt was expressed as to whether the study had ever been completed or even begun.

Reduction of American personnel in the several special staff sections of AFHQ and transfer of certain special staff sections from AFHQ to Hq NATOUSA were recommended on 4 November 1943 by Major General Everett S. Hughes (A), DTC NATOUSA and CG Com Z NATOUSA, because, he said,

Under the US Army system of staff procedure, operation of supply services is a function of subordinate Headquarters: i.e., the control and operation of supply services is decentralized and is not carried on by senior headquarters.⁴⁹

General Hughes entered the discussion again on 11 December 1943 by re-enforcing his earlier proposal, by presenting a redefinition of the territory of Com Z NATOUSA, and by declaring that, if such definition should be accepted,

the only remaining step required to perfect the American organization...(would be) to transfer from AFHQ to (Hq) NATOUSA those officers and other personnel whose duties are exclusively American and whose time is spent in solving problems which are exclusively those of the US Army.⁵⁰

While General Adcock of G-4 (A) agreed substantially with General Hughes's redefinition of Com Z NATOUSA, the former offered some opposition on 15 December 1943 to the removal of most of the special staff sections from AFHQ.⁵¹

No G-4 (Wrote General Adcock) can plan effectively without the benefit and assistance of a suitable special staff, especially when AFHQ moves away from Hq NATOUSA. I believe the preferable solution lies in having the SOS (NATOUSA) take over the G-4 special staff functions of the Com Z (NATOUSA).

49. NATOUSA memo, DTC NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA, 4 Nov 43 (CofS MTOUSA file: 322).

50. NATOUSA memo, DTC NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA, 11 Dec 43 (CofS MTOUSA file: 322).

51. AFHQ memo, ACoFS G-4 AFHQ to CofS AFHQ, 15 Dec 43 (CofS MTOUSA file: 322).

Meanwhile General Larkin, CG SOS NATOUSA, submitted on 14 November 1943 a pro-Hq NATOUSA plan, distinguished by its soundness of approach and elaboration of detail, which provided for an organization, he thought, "equally suitable whether the (Allied) Theater commander were US or British."⁵² General Larkin had in mind

an AFHQ staff...to co-ordinate and advise the (Allied theater) commander on broad inter-Allied aspects of operations and administration, both as concerns the conduct of war in the field and necessary administration over conquered or released cobelligerent territories... This staff, headed in its several sections by officers of considerable rank and broad experience, should be kept small. ...Some broader functions... are provided for by a special group of boards and committees... (which) must, however, confine their activities only to the inter-Allied features, leaving detailed operations to be carried out by the several (Allied) deputy theater commanders and the organizations in whose territorial subdivisions the operations are to be executed. ...While the several staff sections... should maintain contact and liaison with their corresponding sections in lower echelons of the staffs of the several Allies, action matters should be carried out strictly in command channels.

For the subjects of administration and supply he submitted this solution:

It should be fundamental that the combat troops of any nation are backed up for administration and supply by a communications zone or a line of communications commanded, controlled, and manned by personnel of the same nation. For this purpose all parts of the Theater should be clearly allotted as combat zone under task force commander, or commanders, and the rear areas (should be) allotted to the control of whichever nation has the paramount interest in its supply and administrative installations. It is therefore proposed that the forces of each participating ally... not

52. SOS memo, Gen Larkin to Gen Hughes, 14 Nov 43 (CofS MTOUSA file: 322).

assigned to a task force, or forces, be headed by a deputy theater commander, through whom the (Allied) theater commander exercises all command control for administration, training, and supply of the forces of that nation. That is, the deputy theater commander exercises full administrative control over all forces of his nation in the Theater and commands in all matters all forces of his nation in the Theater except those assigned to a task force.

General Larkin finally made the following specific suggestions for the organization of the American Theater:

- a. That the American DTC have a headquarters (NATOUSA) comprising "the normal four" C-sections⁵³ and a special staff to include those sections pertaining to general administration.
- b. That the ACofS G-4 (NATOUSA) command directly Com Z NATOUSA and its base sections in order to secure prompt and direct control of supply activities.
- c. That the staff of the commander of Com Z NATOUSA be organized to perform all G-4 staff functions from a general staff level and to co-ordinate all service staff sections for supply, evacuation, and transportation within Com Z NATOUSA.
- d. That the central office of record for personnel and general administrative matters be in the NATOUSA staff sections, but that the ACofS G-4 (CG Com Z NATOUSA) exercise direct command over base sections.

In conclusion he pointed out the following major advantages in his scheme:

The proposed organization provides a single (American) commander for US forces in the Theater, who can deal in all matters with the

53. When G-5 Section AFHQ was activated on 14 May 44 (AFHQ GO No 15, 14 May 44), it received the military affairs functions of the Civil Affairs Section AFHQ, which had been organized on 15 Sep 42 (History of AFHQ, I, 84) and absorbed the Military Government Section AFHQ, which had been established on 18 June 43 (ibid., II, 469).

54. See footnote 52 above.

(Allied) theater commander. It reduces duplication of special staff sections and gives direct action and co-ordination for all matters of (American) communications zone (supply and administration) operations. The consolidation of activities and acceleration of action should be further enhanced by the establishment of the headquarters of the (Allied) theater commanders, his (American and British) deputies, and the CG Com Z (NATOUSA) in one location and as close to the center of gravity of active operations, both combat and supply, as the situation may permit.

This was the fullest plan of the pro-Hq NATOUSA group with some of its advantages.

By January 1944 it appeared that the cleavage between the views of each group was well defined and that it remained only for decision to be made and for action to be taken. Soon after Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers (A) had assumed command of NATOUSA on 8 January 1944,⁵⁵ it became apparent that he was in accord with the efforts to simplify the administrative organization of Hq NATOUSA and to bring it into closer relations with AFHQ.⁵⁶

On 8 February 1944 he had a chart of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA prepared and distributed, and called for a conference of the chiefs of the NATOUSA staff sections with the CG SOS NATOUSA concerning the transfer of some of the American Theater's staff functions to the SOS headquarters.⁵⁷ Each staff section was to submit by 20 Feb-

55. NATOUSA GO No 5, 8 Jan 44.

56. A preliminary step was made on 3 Feb 44 by NATOUSA GO No 7, sects III and IV, which rescinded the designations of Commander of Communications Zone and of Deputy Commander of North African Theater of Operations.

57. NATOUSA memo, Gen Devers to all concerned, 11 Feb 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 323.35/401-0). This action seems to have been the first recorded indication of the direction to be taken in the process of reorganization.

ruary a chart showing its subdivisions and the minimum number of grades and ratings needed to handle efficiently a normal flow of business.

This conference, held on 14 February 1944, was not very successful. In transmitting the data obtained from the sections at the meeting, General Larkin commented:

In general, the informal representation of the sections concerned have not been such as to indicate a saving in personnel, and it is believed that positive command action will be required in some instances to make the Theater reorganization effective in fact.

General Adcock, ACoS G-4 shared this feeling of discouragement in his written remarks.

The meeting... (wrote General Adcock) was too brief to result in any detailed discussion of the re-allotment of functions between the two headquarters and the resulting effect on the possible redistribution of personnel...

There exist no major differences of opinion as to those functions which should pass to Hq SOS (NATOUSA) that cannot be readily adjusted... The main argument hinges on what personnel in the form of actual (not authorized) individuals (bodies) is to be made available to Hq SOS (NATOUSA) by the various sections.

The greatest difficulty lies in the attempt of each section to visualize just how much the transfer of the agreed duties to Hq SOS (NATOUSA) will lighten the present volume of work. Hence the natural tendency is to wait and determine from experience the new personnel requirements.

Upon receipt of the two above reports General Devers proceeded immediately to clear up the uncertainty mentioned by General Adcock by taking the positive com-

58. NATOUSA memo, Gen Larkin to Gen Devers, 17 Feb 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 323.35).

59. NATOUSA IRS, ACoS G-4 AFHQ to CoS NATOUSA, 19 Feb 44 (AG MTOUSA file: 323.35).

mand action recommended by General Larkin. A general
60
order and an administrative memorandum were both is-
sued on 20 February 1944. The administrative memorandum
contained the provisions of the initial decisions on
American reorganization and is important enough in this
61
discussion to be reproduced here in full:

(1) The information set forth below is published for the guidance of all concerned in connection with the reorganization of this theater which has been effected in the interests of efficient operations and the conservation of personnel and material resources.

(2) The general and special staff of this headquarters (Hq NATOUSA) is composed of the United States elements of the staff of Allied Force Headquarters with the addition of an Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 and such other members⁶² as the Commanding General finds necessary for the proper operation of his headquarters.

(3) By virtue of General Order Number 12, this headquarters, ^{as?} the Commanding General, Services of Supply NATOUSA (General Larkin) has in addition to his other duties assumed command of the Communications Zone, North African Theater.⁶³ For brevity in communications, and in order not to disturb existing nomenclature, reference to that headquarters will continue to be "Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA."⁶⁴

(4) While the Commanding General, North African Theater, will retain a complete general staff and such special staff as may be required, the personnel involved will be held to

60. NATOUSA GO No 12, 20 feb 44, sect I. A restatement of this general order will be found in par 3 of the adm memo quoted at the end of this paragraph.

61. NATOUSA Adm Memo No 2, 20 Feb 44.

62. These other staff members of Hq NATOUSA were: Chief Finance Officer, Judge Advocate, Inspector General, and Joint Rearmament Committee.

63. Gen Hughes was relieved of his assignment as CG Com Z NATOUSA and transferred to Hq ETOUSA. (NATOUSA ltr order, 13 Feb 44 in AG NATOUSA file: 201 E.S. Hughes.)

64. The Hq SOS NATOUSA was not redesignated "Hq Com Z NATOUSA" until 1 Oct 44. (NATOUSA GO No 96, 26 Sep 44, sect I).

a minimum consistent with the mission of broad policy at the theater level as concerns both Theater and the United States elements of Allied Force Headquarters. Functions normally assigned to a communications zone commander as set forth generally in existing Field Service Regulations will be performed by the Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA. The consolidation between the staff of the Theater and that of SOS NATOUSA, in the interests of economy has been made the subject of separate action.

(5) For the purpose of clarification, certain of the functions which will be performed by the Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, within broad policies laid down by the Commanding General of the Theater in addition to those heretofore performed, are enumerated below. These functions are listed under general staff section having primary interest with an indication of the special staff sections concerned.⁶⁵

COMMAND. The Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, will command all base sections and separate depots (except those of the Air Service Command), including troop organizations thereof, and such other activities located in the communications zone as may be placed under his control.

G-1. (a) Operation of replacement system to be as at present except that G-1 NATOUSA will deal directly with Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, and not directly with base section commanders.⁶⁶

65. Although the word "functions" in this clause was not qualified to indicate whether it applied to C2 or Com Z, the intent was to have the adm memo apply only to the Com Z functions. (Statement by Col L.H. Barnhill of G-4 AFHQ--NATOUSA, 11 Sep 45).

66. The procedure was soon altered as follows: "Operation of replacement system to be as at present. Approved requisitions will be forwarded direct to base sections and information copies furnished the CG SOS NATOUSA." (Ltr, Gen Devers to American base sections, 2 Mar 44, in AG NATOUSA file: 200.3/436-0.) The general policies of NATOUSA's replacement system were framed by the ACoFS G-1 NATOUSA, while the control of replacement depots was divided between base sections and armies. Centralized control of this system was effected on 1 June 44 when the Replacement Command was activated at ORAN and was assigned to SOS NATOUSA by NATOUSA GO No 44, 28 May 44, sect I. For a brief account of the replacement system before June 44 see History of the Replacement Command, NATOUSA: June--September 1944, pp 1-5, 12, 52, 99, and Exhibit A.

(b) Religion.	(Chaplain)
(c) Special Service Section.	(SSS)
(d) Morale Services Section. (includes publication of Yank)	(MSS)
(e) Disposition of prisoners of war.	(PMG)
(f) Relation with civilians in Com Z. ⁶⁷	(PMG)
(g) Maintenance of law and order in Com Z.	(PMG)
(h) Graves registration service.	(QM)
(i) G-1 Publication Division (Stars and Stripes).	(SSS)
G-2. (a) Countersubversive, antisabotage, and security measures in Com Z.	(PMG)
(b) Base (postal) censorship, prisoner of war censorship and tele- gram censorship in CZ.	(AG, PMG)
G-3. (a) Organization and equipment of units under command of Commanding General, SOS.	(all services)
(b) Training in Com Z to in- clude selection of training sites.	(all services and JRC)
(c) Organization and conduct of schools in Com Z as directed by the Theater Commander.	(all services and JRC)
(d) Troop movements.	(Trans)
(e) Security of installa- tions and co-ordination of the defense of lines of communication	(PMG, com- manders of assigned and attached troops)

67. In this adm memo "CZ" had been used as the abbreviation for Communication Zone. This has been changed here and throughout the entire quotation to "Com Z" which is the authorized US Army abbreviation. Confirmation of the meaning of the original "CZ" abbreviation was given by Col L.H. Barnhill of G-4 AFHQ--NATOUA, 11 Sep 45.

(f) Signal communications
in Com Z.

(Sig)

(g) Priorities for assignment of personnel and equipment for organizations under command of Commanding General SOS.

(all services)

G-4. In general, the Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, has heretofore handled virtually all G-4 functions at the communications zone level within policies laid down by the Commanding General, North African Theater. Hospitalization and evacuation of men and animals are added to those functions. However, for purposes of clarity, the principal functions are reiterated:

(a) Procurement, storage, and distribution of all supplies except POL and coal.

(all supply services)

(b) Location of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments.

(all supply services)

(c) Transportation of supplies by land, sea, and air.

(Trans)

(d) Construction and maintenance of utilities in Com Z.

(Engrs)

(e) Maintenance of equipment.

(all services)

(f) Traffic control in Com Z.

(PMG)

(g) Hospitalization and evacuation (in Com Z).

(Surg)

(h) Salvage.

(all services)

(i) Disposition of captured supplies in Com Z as directed.

(all services)

(j) Property responsibility and accountability and fiscal matters pertaining thereto.

(all services
Fin O)

(k) Development of materiel.

(all services)

(l) Procurement and lessing of real property in Com Z.

(Engrs)

(6) It is expected that the Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, will relieve the Commanding

General, North African Theater, of those administrative functions normal to the communications Zone and such others as may be assigned or delegated under broad Theater policies and directives.

Pursuant to the provisions of this memorandum and to those of the general order which it implemented, a third directive was issued on 23 February 1944 to carry further the process of reorganization. This general order⁶⁸ announced that the following changes in the current general and special staff sections of Hq NATOUSA would take effect on 24 February 1944:

a. The following general and special staff sections⁶⁹ of this headquarters will continue to operate as separate sections:

(1) Chief of Staff, including Deputy Chief of Staff and Secretary, General Staff.

(2) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

(3) Inspector General.

(4) Judge Advocate General.

(5) Finance.

(6) Joint Rearmament Committee.

b. A Censorship Section is hereby established as a special staff section of this headquarters.⁷² It will be responsible for the censorship of all United States Army and

68. NATOUSA GO No 13, 23 Feb 44.

69. Three offices and one committee were also included in the list below.

70. This section was called officially the "Judge Advocate Section" and not the "Judge Advocate General Section."

71. The Finance Section NATOUSA was redesignated the Fiscal Directorate NATOUSA on 3 May 44. (See NATOUSA GO No 37, 3 May 44, sect I).

72. This had been the Censorship Division of G-2 NATOUSA and was here given a separate status of a special staff section in order to transfer it as such to Hq SOS NATOUSA.

prisoner of war mail entering or leaving the Theater.

c. The following Theater special staff sections and section of a general staff division will continue to perform their normal Theater staff functions, but will be supervised by and report to the Commanding General, SOS NATOUA:⁷³

- (1) G-1 Publications Section of the G-1 Division.
- (2) Army Exchange Service Section.⁷⁴
- (3) Chaplain Section.
- (4) Morale Services Section.
- (5) Special Service Section.
- (6) Provost Marshal General's Section.

73. By NATOUA GO No 19, 17 Mar 44, these sections and this division and their functions were abolished in Hq NATOUA and were transferred completely to Hq SOS NATOUA. But by NATOUA GO No 27, 8 Apr 44, sect I, these elements in Hq SOS NATOUA were directed to perform their respective staff functions for Hq NATOUA in addition to their regular duties with Hq SOS NATOUA. The letter order was interpreted by Hq SOS NATOUA, in its Staff Memo No 35, 21 Apr 44, sect IV, as follows: "The instructions contained in sect I, GO No 27, Hq NATOUA, 8 Apr 44, are interpreted under the provisions of GO No 19, Hq NATOUA, 17 Mar 44, that the special staff sections named will function for the Theater Commander (CG NATOUA) within this headquarters. Co-ordination and action will be accomplished through appropriate general staff sections of Hq SOS NATOUA."

74. In addition to his duties at Hq SOS NATOUA the Chief of the Section was designated Chief Chaplain NATOUA by NATOUA GO No 38, 8 May 44, sect I, and then Theater Chaplain NATOUA by NATOUA GO No 49, 7 June 44, sect I.

(7) Censorship Section.

d. All general and special staff sections of this headquarters, other than those enumerated in paragraphs a and c above, as now constituted, are abolished.

e. The functions of the staff sections abolished by paragraph d, above, will be assumed by the corresponding section of Allied Force Headquarters. The Army of the United States personnel assigned to these (AFHQ) staff sections will constitute the corres-

75. After the reorganization there, appears to have been some controversy over the status of this section in Hq SOS NATOUSA. The History of Communications Zone NATOUSA presents two conflicting accounts: (1) in "History of G-2 Section," per 4 (pt II), the claim is made that "the transfer (of the Censorship Branch) was effected and the function was officially set up as a branch under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (SOS NATOUSA);" (2) in "Special Staff Sections, Second Group," title page (pt II), it is stated that "the Censorship Section listed was never operated as a part of SOS (NATOUSA)." No directive of either Hq NATOUSA or Hq SOS NATOUSA authorizing the absorption of the Censorship Section (or Branch) by the G-2 Section SOS NATOUSA has been found. However, negative evidence pointing to such incorporation exists. The History of Communications Zone NATOUSA preserves two organizational charts of Hq SOS NATOUSA: (1) inclosure No 13 in part I shows the Censorship Section as a special staff section separate from the G-2 Section on 24 Feb 44; (2) from inclosure No 15 in part I the Censorship Section is missing on 7 Apr 44, while the G-2 Section appears as previously. Presumably, then, the Censorship Section became an organic part of the G-2 Section SOS NATOUSA within the limits of those dates. However, it should be remarked that Hq NATOUSA apparently had no official knowledge of any loss of independence by its former Censorship Section, which was regarded still as a separate section in Hq SOS NATOUSA by Hq NATOUSA GO Nos 13 (23 Feb 44), 19 (17 Mar 44), 27 (8 Apr 44).

By NATOUSA GO No 52, 10 June 44, sect I, par 2, the CG SOS NATOUSA was relieved of responsibility for this section's work and the ACofS G-2 NATOUSA (in G-2 AFHQ--NATOUSA) became responsible "for censorship of US ARMY mail, prisoner of war mail (entering or leaving NATOUSA), and related censorship matters (in NATOUSA)," effective at a date to be determined by the CG NATOUSA and the ACofS G-2 NATOUSA, but in no event later than 15 June 44. No evidence of the actual date of transfer of responsibility seemed to exist in what records were available in the summer of 1945.

ponding staff section of this headquarters and will continue operating under the same allotment of personnel now granted the Allied Force Section unless modified by separate action. The senior officer of the Army of the United States in each such section is, in addition to his other duties, designated as chief of the corresponding section of this headquarters.

In other words, as succinctly stated on 4 June 1944
by Major General Jack W. Heard (A), Chairman of the War
Department Manpower Board,⁷⁶ the results of this reorg-
anization of Hq NATOUSA were threefold:⁷⁷

... to transfer the work and personnel of some sections (of Hq NATOUSA) to corresponding sections of AFHQ; to transfer some of the work and the personnel (of Hq NATOUSA) to corresponding sections of (Hq) SOS (NATOUSA); to abolish some sections (of Hq NATOUSA).

In one respect General Heard's analysis and the NATOUSA GO 13 of 23 February 1944 were misleading because they indicated that certain sections were "abolished." Actually no sections were abolished. In the case of G-2 and G-3 NATOUSA the personnel of those sections were transferred to SOS NATOUSA, but the sections themselves continued to exist as the American components of G-2 and G-3 AFHQ. From this confusion between wording and actuality emerged the following arrangements for the so-called "abolished" NATOUSA staff sections:

a. G-2, G-3, and Signal sections became the American components in the corresponding sections of AFHQ.

b. Adjutant General Section combined with

76. The WDMB was a commission of the OCoFS WD.

77. Ltr, Gen Heard to CG NATOUSA, subject: "Staffs and Staff Organizations," 4 June 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 321.2 G-1).

Adjutant General Section AFHQ to become Adjutant General Section AFHQ--Hq NATOUSA.

c. Transportation Section became Transportation Section (A) of AFHQ--Hq NATOUSA.

d. G-4, Ordnance sections and Headquarters Command, all of which were purely American and in AFHQ--Hq NATOUSA, remained in AFHQ--Hq NATOUSA.

e. The following NATOUSA sections continued as the American components in the corresponding sections of AFHQ:

- (1) Quartermaster.
- (2) Allied Force Local Resources
- (3) Petroleum.
- (4) Medical.
- (5) Engineer.
- (6) Military Railway.
- (7) Chemical Warfare.
- (8) Field Artillery.
- (9) Antiaircraft and Coast Defense.
- (10) Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense.
- (11) Liaison.
- (12) Information and Censorship.
- (13) Civil Affairs.
- (14) Military Government.

By 21 March 1944 the CG NATOUSA thought that sufficient time had elapsed since 20 February 1944 (date of the initial reorganization) to permit the CG SOS NATOUSA to effect certain necessary physical rearrangements of headquarters personnel and facilities and to assume com-

(6) Joint Disposal Committee (12
97
May 44)

(7) Radar and Radio Countermeasures
98
Board (9 June 44)

b. Redesignation of a board:

The North African Shipping Board (NAS-
BO) was redesignated the Mediterranean
Shipping Board (MEDBO) on 18 December
99
1943.


c. Abolition of a board:

North African Economic Board (NAEB)
100
(26 May 44). The functions of
this board were assumed by the North
African Joint Economic Mission
(NAJEM) which was not a part of
101
AFHQ.

A chart of the organizations of AFHQ Hq NATOUSA, and
Hq SOS NATOUSA and of their interrelation in June 1944 is
shown on the next page.

-
97. AFHQ Adm Memo No 19, 12 May 44.
98. AFHQ Staff Memo No 56, 9 June 44.
99. AFHQ Adm Memo No 91, 18 Dec 43.
100. AFHQ Adm Memo No 22, 26 May 44.
101. Ibid.

JUNE 1944



8. Personnel Problems

a. Changes in AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA Personnel. The investigation conducted during the summer of 1943 by the Office of the Inspector General (War Department) into the "organization, administration, supply, and procedures within the North African... Theater of Operations" 102 had considerable influence in stimulating efforts toward the reorganization of the American higher-echelon headquarters 103 in the interest of reducing personnel. Much study and discussion of the problem took place during the remaining months of 1943, but no specific action was taken until General Devers assumed command of NATOUSA in January 1944.

102. Memo, IG (WD) to DCoFS (WD), 6 Aug 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 333.1-181).

103. No such general overhauling seems to have characterized the British system of reorganization in the Mediterranean Theater. However, the War Establishment Committee (B) sat at AFHQ at least once weekly in 1943 and thrice weekly in 1944 to consider inter alia the problem of achieving economy in manpower not only in AFHQ but also throughout the Theater. From 22 Feb 44 the Committee had as an advisor a British officer designated as Investigator of Manpower. For full accounts of the WE Committee and the IofM see History of AFHQ, II, 277-282; III, ch XXIII, sect 5.

One sample of such work in this period is cited. On 16 May 44 Col R.B. Rathbone (B), IofM AFHQ, submitted to Brig K.C. Cooper (B), Brig G-3 Org (B) AFHQ, a short study proposing reductions in the WE (NA/30/3) at AFHQ. He considered that the suggested decreases, based upon a study of the authorized numbers and the organization charts of the sections concerned, could be effected without undue loss of efficiency. In twelve of seventeen section reviewed Col Rathbone recommended a saving of sixty-seven officers and other ranks. See G-3 AFHQ study, IofM to Brig G-3 Org, 16 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 250/Org-3; document 39). No information about the fate of this proposal existed on 5 Sep 45 when the document was discovered. However, the number of authorized British personnel for AFHQ did increase by 206 between Nov 43 and June 44.

See sect 4 above in this chapter for the reorganization of American headquarters in NATOUSA, Feb--Mar 44.

On his arrival the total authorized personnel (American and British) at AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA in ALGIERS was 4,072, of which 2,012 were American and 2,060 were British.

After General Devers's appointment, but before his assumption of command, the CofS WD had cabled to the CofS AFHQ that the several economy measures contemplated at AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA "must be instituted without delay and must be drastic in scope." Among these was the planned reduction in the size of the Headquarters Command (A). This organization included not only the personnel allotted to the several staff sections of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA but also the personnel authorized for seventy units either assigned or attached to Hq Comd AF mostly for service in the field.

Soon after Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers (A) had become the CG NATOUSA on 8 January 1944, steps to reduce the number of American personnel in NATOUSA were taken. As a part of this Theater effort a directive was sent to the staff sections of Hq NATOUSA and AFHQ calling attention to the fact that the manpower situation in the UNITED STATES as it affected the American army was critical, announcing that all overstrengths authorized by Hq NATOUSA were cancelled, and ordering that personnel in excess of T/O or T/A strength be returned

104. History of AFHQ, II, 246.

105. Cable No 5947, WD to AFHQ, 29 Dec 43.

106. Ibid.

107. These units varied in size from detachments to regiments. Some of these organizations were composed of personnel who were mostly attached to combat units, as for example liaison and intelligence personnel attached to armies, corps, divisions, and regiments. See History of AFHQ, II, 287-289.

to replacement pools not later than 15 February 1944. The directive continued thus:

The chief of every US Army staff section of this headquarters (NATOUSA) and AFHQ will make an immediate survey of his staff section and submit a report to the Adjutant General as to what individuals can be released for general assignment purposed and replaced by limited assignment personnel. This directive applies particularly to enlisted men in clerical positions, messengers, drivers, and men whose duties do not require a high degree of physical fitness. This report will include any officers or enlisted men who do not have full time jobs and can be released for other duties. A negative report is requested in the event that no reductions are practicable.¹⁰⁸

The reorganization of the American component in AFHQ, of Hq NATOUSA, and of Hq SOS NATOUSA in February and March 1944¹⁰⁹ was accomplished by several directives, some of which stated that one of the objects of the reorganization was the conservation of manpower.¹¹⁰ The abolition,¹¹¹ transfer,¹¹² and absorption¹¹³ of various general and special

108. NATOUSA Staff Memo No 6, 28 Jan 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 300.6).

109. See sect 4 above in this chapter for the reorganization of the American hqs in NATOUSA, Feb--Mar 44.

110. Of course, beyond the customary citation of military authority, general orders do not always explain why such directives are issued. There were four such general orders concerned with this reorganization (see footnote 114 below), two of which specified the reasons for the directed action. NATOUSA memo, Gen Devers to All Concerned, 11 Feb 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 323.35/401-0): "one of the principal objectives of this reorganization is to conserve personnel." NATOUSA Adm Memo No 2, 20 Feb 44: "the reorganization of this theater which has been effected in the interest of...the conservation of personnel..." Compare also NATOUSA ltr, Gen Devers to Gen Heard, 8 Mar 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 319.1-418-0): "The CG SOS NATOUSA has been assigned all Com Z units and installations and has instituted actions to consolidate and displace numerous activities in order to economize further on manpower".

111. Some separate sections in Hq NATOUSA were abolished.

112. Some in Hq NATOUSA were transferred to Hq SOS NATOUSA.

113. Some in Hq NATOUSA were absorbed by corresponding sections in AFHQ or Hq SOS NATOUSA.

staff sections as well as the subsequent adjustments of
functions made necessary by these changes¹¹⁴ naturally
reduced the American staff personnel.¹¹⁵ Also in March an
additional reduction of American personnel in Hq Comd AF was
effected by the reassignment of some of the headquarters¹¹⁶
organizations which operated directly under AFHQ. These two
phases of the reorganization resulted in a considerable
saving of actual American personnel assigned or attached to
AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA.¹¹⁷

In the late spring of 1944 representatives of the War
Department Manpower Board,¹¹⁸ headed by Major General Jack
W. Heard (A), made a survey of the progress already attained
in the staff reorganizations of various American headquarters
in the Theater and on 4 June 1944 submitted a report to

114. NATOUSA Adm Memo No 2, 20 Feb 44; NATOUSA GO Nos 12, 20 Feb 44, sect I; No 13, 23 Feb 44, pars c. and e.; No 19, 17 Mar 44. NATOUSA Staff Memo No 14, 21 Mar 44. See also NATOUSA GO No 27, 8 Apr 44, sect I.

115. By NATOUSA ltr order, CG NATOUSA to GO Hq Comd AF, 3 Mar 44 (G-1 NATOUSA file: AG 320.3-435 A-0) the allotments of grades and ratings made to the following office and sections of Hq NATOUSA were cancelled: DTC, G-2, G-3, G-4, AG, QM, Med, Ord, Sig, Tpn.

116. See footnote 107 above. Of these organizations, which had increased from 70 in Nov 43 to 82 in Mar 44, 22 were transferred from AFHQ to base sections. See NATOUSA ltrs, CG NATOUSA to CG SOS NATOUSA, 26 and 28 Mar 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 370.5/489 A-0).

117. Between 27 Jan 44 and 27 Mar 44 AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA lost 892 American personnel and the Hq Comd organizations were reduced by 3,051 American officers and enlisted men: a total saving of 3,943 American personnel. These figures are taken from what is commonly called the Heard Report, incl No 1, par 3b; par 4b (3) and (4); and app "C" to that incl. This report was made on 4 June 44 by Maj Gen Jack W. Heard (A), Chairman of the WD Manpower Board, to the CG NATOUSA (AG MTOUSA file: 319.1, vol 3).

118. The Board was responsible to the CofS WD.

General Devers. This study presented recommendations which were

the result of a combination of detailed personal surveys, comparison of similar staff functions, evaluation of work-loads, and the consideration of statements as to essential numbers of staff personnel by commanders and by officers heading various sections thereof.

General Heard reported no recommendations for changes in the number of American personnel serving in the twenty-seven staff organizations of AFHQ, in the eleven headquarters organizations commanded by the CO Hq Comd AF, in the eight staff organizations of Hq NATOUSA, and in twenty-five Hq Command organizations nominally assigned to Hq NATOUSA. However, in two Hq Command organizations assigned to Hq NATOUSA and serving both it and AFHQ, the 2623d and the 2625th Sig Regts (Prov), the WDMB recommended changes in the number of their personnel. While it advised an increase of thirty-five in the former unit, the Board proposed a decrease of forty-nine

119. Heard Report to CG NATOUSA, 4 June 44 (AG MTOUSA file: 319.1, vol 3).

120. Heard Report, inclosure No 1, app "A". No reasons given.

121. Ibid., inclosure No 1, app "D". No reasons given.

122. Ibid., inclosure No 2, par 2 c, and app "A". Gen Heard gave these reasons for "making no recommendations for further reductions in these staff sections... : (1) Some of the (Hq) NATOUSA staff sections are also partly AFHQ staff sections... (2) The recent reorganization (Feb-Mar 44) has already effected a large personnel reduction (incl No 2, par 2 c)".

123. Ibid., incl No 2, par 4 a. Gen Heard stated: "All of these organizations are highly technical in character and some are combat units whose activities are far-reaching. Because of the nature of these units, and their functions, and because the operations of most of them are controlled by AFHQ or higher authority, the Theater of Operations Section, WDMB, is making no recommendations regarding their strengths."

124. Ibid., incl No 2, par 5 c (3), and app "C".

in the latter organization, thus effecting a reduction
126
of fourteen.

After sufficient time had elapsed to permit a full
consideration of the Heard Report, the CG NATOUSA wrote to
127
the CofS WD on 27 June 1944 that

...further consolidations to result in reduction in the aggregate strength of higher headquarters in this theater are planned upon the displacement of Hq SOS NATOUSA, Hq NATOUSA, and AFHQ to ITALY. The effect of these savings, however, are not expected to become apparent until about 31 August 1944. ...At the present time it is not believed that any of the staff sections are in excess of minimum requirements. A continuous survey will be made to assure reductions in numbers when at all justified.

As distinguished from the saving in actual American personnel in the AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA staff sections and service units (shown in footnote 117 above), the decrease in the T/Os of authorized American personnel (-207) in just the staff sections of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA during this period (December 1943 to June 1944) merely exceeded by one the increase in the British authorized personnel (+206). The net result in authorized personnel, therefore, was merely a decrease of one from the combined authorized strengths in June 1944 below those of November

125. Ibid., incl No 2, par 6 c (3), and app "D". Gen Heard also suggested a reduction from 1,690 (its actual strength on 27 Mar 44) to 858, whenever AFHQ would move from ALGIERS, and then to 300, provided that the Center District of MBS would have been closed 60 days after AFHQ's departure from NORTH AFRICA.

126. All figures were calculated only for actual strength. In each instance the recommendation did not exceed the authorized strength as of 27 Mar 44. In fact, the changes, if adopted, would leave these units 388 short of their combined authorized strength.

127. NATOUSA ltr, CG NATOUSA to CofS WD, 27 June 44 (AG MTOUSA file: 319.1/418 A-O).

1943. The total authorized strengths (American and British) by ranks and grades for the staff sections of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA in November 1943 and June 1944 are shown in the table on the next page.

b. General Staff Corps with Troops (American). In view of the importance attached to the general staff by foreign nations, G-1 NATOUSA requested and received from the War Department an increase in the allotment of GSC appointments to the Theater in order to insure US Army prestige in dealing with foreign officers. The sub-
128
allotment to AFHQ was increased from 45 in August 1943 to 61 in June 1944. These 61 appointments were distrib-
129
uted among the various staff sections as follows:

Chief of Staff NATOUSA (including (DCofS and SGS)	5
Deputy Chief of Staff AFHQ (including SGS)	5
G-1 NATOUSA	11
G-2	8
G-3	16
G-4	10
G-5	2
INC	2
Liaison	2

128. AG WD Ltr 320.2 to CG NATOUSA, 14 Mar 44, authorized a Theater GSC allotment of 145. In Cable No W-5097, NATOUSA to WD, 13 Mar 44, the Theater requested an increase to 250. In Cable No 2545, WD to AFHQ, 18 Mar 44, the WD authorized an increase to 200.

129. NATOUSA Staff Memo No 12, 11 Mar 44, as amended by NATOUSA Staff Memo No 18, 5 Apr 44, and by AG NATOUSA Ltr 210.3/382 A-O to G-3 AFHQ, 23 Apr 44.

TABLE OF AFHQ AND HQ NATOUSA AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

November 1943 and June 1944

OFFICERS					ENLISTED MEN				
Rank	Am		Br		Rank	Am		Br	
	Nov 43*	Jun 44#	Dec 43*	Jun 44#		Nov 43*	Jun 44#	Dec 43*	Jun 44#
Gen & Col	114	97	63	70	M/Sgt	66	60		
Lt Col	125	105	100	106	T/Sgt	119	101		
Maj	152	154	166	171	S/Sgt	120	98	44	47
Capt	164	143	173	193	Tec 3	127	97		
1st Lt	129	66	50	67	Sgt	83	44	130	162
2nd Lt	9	12			Tec 4	262	245		
					Cpl	55	31	176	204
					Tec 5	225	262		
Totals:	693	577	552	607	Pfc	129	160	145	181
					Pvt	78	84	940	990
WARRANT OFFICERS									
CWO	30	24	25	28					
WOJG	25	22	48	47					
Totals:	55	46	73	75		1264	1182	1435	1584

	1943	1944
Total Americans:	2012	1805
Total British :	2060	2266
COMBINED TOTALS:	4072	4071

* From tabulation of American authorized AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA T/Os in effect during Nov 43 (from AG AFHQ and G-1 MTOUSA files).

From tabulation of American authorized AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA T/Os in effect during June 44 (from AG AFHQ and G-1 MTOUSA files).

* AFHQ WE(B), XII/1/4, effective date 1 Dec 43 (AG AFHQ file: 321-1(AFHQ)).

* AFHQ WE(B), NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44.

c. Women's Army Corps (American). On 12 August 1943, because of the increasing number of WACs entering the Theater, Major Westray B. Boyce was appointed as Theater WAC Staff Director in the G-1 Section NATOUSA to supervise WAC matters within the Theater. She was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel on 8 February 1944.

The Theater WAC Staff Director was responsible for recommendations to the CG NATOUSA and to the appropriate staff sections on all WAC matters within the Theater. These included plans and policies pertaining to personnel, training, and supply programs--especially those involving questions of procurement, classification, assignment, transfer, discipline, command, separation, housing and recreation as they affected the well-being and maximum utilization of WAC personnel. Another principal function was continuous inspection of WAC personnel within the Theater for the purpose of gaining information on which to base her recommendations. All WAC personnel questions which were forwarded to or initiated by Headquarters NATOUSA were referred to the WAC Staff Director for comment and concurrence prior to final action.

Personnel originally authorized to the Office of the Theater WAC Staff Director were absorbed into the T/O of G-1 Section NATOUSA on 25 February 1944.

Although the number of WACs employed in various

130. NATOUSA GO No 77, 12 Aug 43.

131. WD SO No 33, 8 Feb 44.

132. NATOUSA Staff Memo No 6, 6 Feb 44.

133. AG NATOUSA Ltr 220.2-358 AO, AG NATOUSA to G-1 NATOUSA, 25 Feb 44. NATOUSA SO No 55, 26 Feb 44.

headquarters in the Theater increased substantially during early 1944, the number utilized in staff sections of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA remained approximately the same. A comparison of WAC officers and enlisted women actually assigned (as contracted to authorized) within AFHQ and Headquarters NATOUSA between November 1943 and June 1944 is shown in the following table:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED WOMEN</u>		
Rank	Nov 43*	June 44 ^z	Rank	Nov 43*	June 44 ^z
Lt Col		1	T/Sgt		3
Maj	1		S/Sgt	7	13
Capt	5	2	Tec 3	7	14
1st Lt	2	1	Sgt	7	6
2nd Lt	4	1	Tec 4	48	60
			Cpl	6	8
			Tec 5	51	78
			Pfc	31	39
			Pvt	76	10
<hr/>			<hr/>		
Totals:	12	5		233	231
			Total American Women (1943): 245		
			Total American Women (1944): 236		

The distribution of this WAC personnel among the AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA staff sections, offices, boards, and committees on 26 June 1944 is shown in the table on the next page. 134 Owing to the reorganization of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA in February 1944, it will be seen that the WACs were concentrated in larger numbers in fewer staff sections.

* From Hq Comd Weekly Staff Sect Report, 22 Nov 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 324.5-108).

^z From Hq Comd Weekly Staff Sect Report, 26 June 44 and MRU Staff Sect Roster of Officers, 25 June 44 (files of AG Stats AFHQ).

134. From Hq Comd Weekly Staff Sect Report, 26 June 44; and from MRU Staff Sect Roster of Officers, 25 June 44 (files of AG Stats AFHQ).

TABLE OF WAC DISTRIBUTION WITHIN AFHQ. AND HEADQUARTERS NATOU SA
26 June 1944

[illegible]

d. Auxiliary Territorial Service (British). The British Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS), sister unit of the WAC (American), was introduced into the organization of AFHQ for the purpose of implementing the shortage of clerical staff and of releasing men for more active duty. The necessary arrangements for the accommodation and administration of ATS at AFHQ were completed by the end of 1943, and a new subsection A-8 of G-1 (B) Section was formed to deal with their reception, employment, and administration in the Theater on 30 December 135 1943. The first party of ATS other ranks was assigned for duty with various staff branches and services at AFHQ early in January 1944. 136 Since there was no separate war establishment for ATS in the Headquarters, they counted in their own rank against the normal AFHQ war establishment.

Controller Lady Maud Baillie (B) was appointed Chief of the ATS Subsection and Deputy Director ATS at AFHQ on 137 8 January 1944. She was succeeded as Chief of this subsection and as Assistant Director ATS at AFHQ by 138 Chief Commander M.D. Thorne (B) on 2 June 1944.

The ranks held by other rank personnel of the ATS were in accordance with normal British Army procedure, but ATS officers held commissions with titled differing from those of the regular army. The totals of ATS assigned to AFHQ on 30 June 1944 are shown by ranks in the

135. WEC AFHQ, Min of Mtg No 57, 30 Dec 43.
136. Ltrs, ADATS AFHQ to G-3 (Hist) AFHQ, 18 Jan 45 and 9 Aug 45 (G-3 (Hist) AFHQ file: History of AFHQ).
137. Ltr, ADATS AFHQ to G-3 (Hist) AFHQ, 9 Aug 45
138. Ibid.

table below:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>OTHER RANKS</u>	
C Comd	(Lt Col)	1	Sgt	5
J Comd	(Capt)	32	Cpl	15
Sub	(1st Lt)	10	Pte	28
Totals			43	48

Total British Women (1944): 91

A table giving the distribution of ATS personnel to the staff branches and services at AFHQ on 30 June 1944 is shown on the next page.

9. Plans for the Move of AFHQ to ITALY

As early as June 1943, after the close of the Tunisian campaign, AFHQ foresaw the possibility that most British and American formations and base installations, including AFHQ, might move forward into ITALY in the wake of a successful and extensive invasion of that country.

General Eisenhower was also anxious to eliminate the difficulties inherent in the geographical dispersion of the headquarters of the three commanders-in-chief, especially evident in planning future operations. The Air C-in-C had to control his air forces from the center of air communications at LA MARSA, TUNISIA, and the Naval C-in-C had to be at a port where adequate naval communications existed.

139. Ibid. Equivalent army rank is shown in parentheses.

140. Ibid.

141. Min of Mtg on Future Opns, 14 June 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Misc Opns)

142. Min of Mtg at LA MARSA, 17 July 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Misc Opns).

ALLOCATION OF ATS PERSONNEL TO STAFF BRANCHES AND SERVICES AT AFHQ
30 June 1944

	G-1 (B)	G-2	G-3	G-4 Mov & Tn	G-5	SGS	IS & PS	Dep Mil Sec	Log Plans	Q (AE)	Ord	REME	S & T Works	TOTALS
C Comd	1													1
J Comd	5	3	4	2	2	1	1		1	3	3	3	2	32
Sub		9											1	10
TOTAL OFFICERS	6	12	4	2	2	1	1		1	3	3	3	2	43
Sgt	1											1	3	5
Cpl	5							1			2	3	4	15
Pte	10										3	3	12	28
TOTAL ORs	16							1			5	7	19	48
COMBINED TOTALS	22	12	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	8	10	22	91

In August 1943, when the success of the Sicilian campaign was assured and plans were well under way for an advance into southern ITALY, the Allied C-in-C determined to move AFHQ to the vicinity of NAPLES as soon as the situation permitted. He intended to establish a small tactical headquarters first, to be followed later¹⁴³ by the main headquarters. The Headquarters Commandant AFHQ was made responsible for the preparation of a final plan for movement based on information supplied by all staff sections. Headquarters NATOUSA, with its purely American administrative functions, would then separate¹⁴⁴ from AFHQ and remain in NORTH AFRICA.

A reconnaissance party, sent to ITALY in October 1943 to survey possible accommodations for the combined headquarters of the three services, rejected a group of buildings in NAPLES as having inadequate space but favored the Royal Palace at CASERTA, located only eighteen miles north of NAPLES.¹⁴⁵ Since the Palace was already being used to house Hq 5th Army and later Hq 15th Army Group, their elaborate communication networks and signal facilities would be available there for AFHQ.¹⁴⁶

After the survey it was tentatively decided to move the advance echelon of AFHQ to CASERTA by 15 December 1943, when it was expected that the operational advance would permit Hq 5th Army and Hq 15th Army Group to move

143. Min of CofS Conf No 79, 4 Aug 43. PALERMO was also considered at this time, but discarded.

144. Min of CofS Conf No 82, 13 Aug 43.

145. Report of Reconnaissance of Vicinity of NAPLES by Hq Comdt and Party, transmitted by G-3 AFHQ to CofS AFHQ, 21 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 4/2).

146. Statement by Capt E.J. McKelvey of HQ Comd, 19 July 45.

forward. But, because the Allied December attack on the Winter and Gustav lines bogged down in the mud and mountains below CASSINO, the Allied C-in-C decided not to move the advance echelon to CASERTA and opened, instead, only a small command post there.

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After General Wilson assumed command in January 1944, he considered the possibilities of moving AFHQ to TUNIS or MALTA. The Tunis plan was abandoned, however, because of inadequate communications facilities (only two cables, as compared to seven at ALGIERS, for a headquarters with a traffic equal to two-thirds that of the War Department) and because of scattered and insufficient accommodation as well as limited water supply. Like-
wise the selection of MALTA was vetoed because Hq NAAF objected to the limited accommodation, the isolated location, and the delays required to install satisfactory signal facilities.

149

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Compelling reasons, however, directed a move forward as soon as feasible. The Allied C-in-C was anxious to bring his eight associated headquarters together at one place; the Air C-in-C needed a forward command post in ITALY to control his air units, most of which by then were concentrated there; and the C-in-C Mediterranean also wished to move to CASERTA, as soon as facilities

147. AFHQ memo to all concerned, 24 Nov 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.5-159).

148. AFHQ memo to all concerned, 15 Dec 43 (AG AFHQ file: 322-1 GCT-AGN). AFHQ memo to all concerned, 29 Dec 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.5-159).

149. Memo by Gen Gammell, 14 Jan 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 337-2). Ltr, Gammell to Kennedy, 17 Jan 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

150. MALTA was suggested by the CIGS. Min of C-in-C Conf, 4 Feb 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 337-5). Memo, G-3 to CofS, 28 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 4/2).

could be provided, in order to be more in the center of his operational units. Consequently General Wilson decided in February to move all AFHQ to CASERTA as soon as the operational situation permitted General Alexander's headquarters and the hospitals to evacuate the Palace and surrounding areas. It was expected that, if the Anzio landing and Cassino battle were successful, ROME would be in our hands in February and Hq ACMF (formerly 15th Army Group and later called AAI) could go forward in sufficient time to allow AFHQ to move to CASERTA by 151 31 March. Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Force (MAAF) did go forward to CASERTA on 23 February, 152 but AFHQ and the remaining associated headquarters were unable to come to the Palace at that time because the static situation at ANZIO and before CASSINO prevented the evacuation of the building by Hq ACMF. Space also became more scarce in the Caserta Palace when FLAMBO joined Hq ACMF in March. By that time it was realized that it would be impossible for AFHQ to take over the 153 Palace until about June, although Hq Command continued to make detailed plans for the move and actually began the initial construction of facilities in the Palace area.

151. Min of C-in-C Conf, 12 Feb 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 337-5).

152. Gen Eaker and a small staff arrived in mid-January, but the movement from LA MARSIA was not complete until the end of March. The small rear Hq MAAF in ALGIERS did not arrive until early June. From History of MAAF, I, 49 and 55.

153. Ltr, Gammell to Kennedy, 21 Feb 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15); memo CofS to DCofS, 20 Apr 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 320.2-2 vol II).

With the success of the May drive on ROME final plans were completed for the belated move. Hq MAAF and Hq AAF/MTO were already housed in the Palace, and it was then decided to bring over AFHQ, Hq NATOUSA, Hq C-in-C Mediterranean, Hq Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force (MACAF), Hq SCS NATOUSA, and the British GHQ 2nd Echelon (O2E) at one time, thus bringing eight related headquarters together in the vicinity of NAPLES and CASERTA. The Headquarters Commandant AFHQ was responsible for any revisions of the earlier plan, and G-3 prepared orders for phasing the move as a basis for detailed movement instructions by G-4 (Mov and Tn).¹⁵⁴ It was planned to move these headquarters from NORTH AFRICA in three echelons: on 30 June, an advance party of representatives of HQ Command and the Signal Section and one officer from each staff section; from 7 to 17 July, the advanced echelon of approximately one-third of each staff section, organized to carry on all functions; between 20 July and 3 August, a rear echelon of the rest of the personnel in¹⁵⁵ ALGIERS. When AFHQ would officially open at CASERTA on 20 July 1944, the three highest headquarters directly under the Allied C-in-C would be at long last grouped together in closer proximity to the Combat Zone.

154. AG AFHQ memo 370.5-4 to all concerned, 14 June 44.

155. AG AFHQ memo to all concerned, 2 July 44 (AG AFHQ file: 370.5-4).

Chapter XXIII

PERSONNEL STAFF ORGANIZATIONS

There were four principal changes in the personnel staff organizations of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA in the period between 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944: (1) The two separate American AG sections of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA were combined into one AG Section AFHQ--NATOUSA in February 1944. (2) The G-1 (B) Section organized several new subsections to deal especially with problems concerned with the ATS, manpower economy, and demobilization. (3) The British WE Committee sent forward to Hq AAI a WE Sub-Committee to help with the details of British personnel administration in ITALY. (4) The American Headquarters Command was relieved of the supervision of 51 assigned or attached units which became the responsibility of Center District MBS.

The details of these and other minor changes are given in the accounts of these organizations in the separate sections of this chapter.

1. G-1 (British) Section

a. Deputy Adjutant General (DAG). The position of DAG was upgraded to a major general's appointment on 6¹ October 1943. Brigadier V. J. E. Westropp (B), however, continued to hold this office until the arrival of his

1. WO Micro P/13552/19 (MS1a) 13 Jan 44.

2

successor Major General C.D. Moorhead (B) on 12 December 1943.

b. Changes in Functions. The functions of G-1 (B) Section, in its position as the British administrative and personnel staff branch, remained the same as they were in 1943.

c. Changes in Organization. During the first three months of 1944 four new subsections were introduced into G-1 (B) Section to meet additional commitments in the Theater. The designations of, and the reasons for, establishing the new subsections were as follows:

(1) A-8 was authorized on 30 December 1943 to make the necessary arrangements for the reception, employment, and administration of the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) in the Theater.

(2) A-9 and A-10 were authorized on 24 March 1944 because shortage of manpower necessitated a stricter control of the available British personnel in the Theater. Detailed personnel work, previously performed by the British services, was therefore consolidated in G-1 (B) Section in order to:

2. WO Auth 14723 MS 16 Dec 43. Brig Westropp was granted the rank and pay of major general from 6 Oct 43 until 11 Dec 43 but was not addressed as major general during that period. WO Micro P/13552/19 (MS1a), 13 Jan 44.

3. See History of AFHQ, II, 256-258.

4. WEC AFHQ, Min of Mtg No 57, 30 Dec 43, CAO Conf AFHQ, No 194, 27 Dec 43.

5. WEC AFHQ, Min of Mtg No 84, 24 Mar 44.

6. Ltr DAG G-1 (B) AFHQ to WEC AFHQ, 10 Mar 44 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: 1682/1/A1). Cable No F 25145, AFHQ to WO, 30 Mar 44.

(a) Effect economy in manpower.

(b) Co-ordinate and unify personnel policy throughout the arms and services.

(c) Maintain statistics affecting the arms and branches of the Army. The arms and services were divided between these two subsections as follows:

A-9 - Royal Engineers, Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Electrical and mechanical Engineers, Corps of Military Police, and Pioneer Corps.

A-10 - Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery (Field), Royal Artillery (AA & CD), Royal Corps of Signals, Infantry, and General List.

(3) A-11 was authorized on 24 March 1944 to consider problems concerning the demobilization of the British forces. An officer was authorized on 6 January 1944 to deal with demobilization matters, but it was not until 24 March 1944 that this position was designated as a subsection.

A chart of the organization of G-1

(B) Section in June 1944 is shown on the next page.


7. Ltr DAG G-1 (B) AFHQ to WEC AFHQ, 10 Mar 44 (G-1) (B) AFHQ file: 1682/1/A1).

8. WEC AFHQ, Min of Mtg No 84, 24 Mar 44.

9. WEC AFHQ, Min of Mtg No 58, 6 Jan 44.

10. Statement by SQMS Pritchard, G-1 (B) A-1 AFHQ, 17 July 1944.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF G-1 (BRITISH) SECTION AFHQ
June 1944



d. Changes in Personnel. A large increase in the personnel authorized for G-1 (B) Section occurred between 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944. The two personnel subsections, formed to effect economies in manpower, accounted for 60 of the additional persons¹¹ but decreases in the personnel subsections of the British services at AFHQ during this period compensated for this, to a certain extent.¹² The personnel authorized for G-1 (B) Section on 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944 are shown in the table below:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>OTHER RANKS</u>		
Rank	Dec 43*	June 44#	Rank	Dec 43*	June 44#	Rank	Dec 43*	June 44#
Maj Gen	1	1	WO I	2	1	S/Sgt	3	4
Brig	2	2	WO II	4	3	Sgt	8	20
Col	1	1				Cpl	12	23
Lt Col	6	10				L/Cpl	5	15
Maj	10	22				Pte	26	44
Capt	12	23						
Lt	1	4						
Totals:	33	63		6	4		54	106

Total British (1943): 93
Total British (1944): 173

2. G-1 Section (American) NATOUSA

a. Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 (A) NATOUSA. Brigadier General Ben M. Sawbridge (A) continued to serve as Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 throughout the first half of

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11. WE NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44.
 12. See footnote 6 above.
 - * WE VIII/374/1, wef 1 Dec 43.
 - # WE NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44.

13
1944.

b. Changes in Functions. In general the functions of the G-1 Section NATOUSA remained the same as in the previous period as defined by AR 10-15 and as described in Parts I and II of this history.¹⁴ With the consolidation of some of the staff sections of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA on 23 February 1944, however, the Publications Section and its functions (including the operational supervision of The Stars and Stripes) were transferred to Hq SOS NATOUSA.¹⁵ A minimum of policy supervision of publications was still maintained by G-1 NATOUSA.¹⁶

On 1 June 1944 the Replacement Command under Brigadier General L.C. Jaynes (A) was established and assigned to SOS NATOUSA.¹⁷ The purpose of this command was to provide a clearing house to supply American manpower to the armies and to the network of supporting units within the North African Theater of Operations.¹⁸ The responsibility for estimating the total number of replacements required and the procurement of a sufficiently large number of men to meet replacement needs remained a function of the G-1 Section NATOUSA.

c. Changes in Organization. No change in organization of G-1 NATOUSA occurred during this period other than the transfer of the Publications Section to SOS NA-

13. NATOUSA GO No 6, 15 Feb 43.

14. AR 10-15, 13 July 43, par 7 b. See also History of AFHQ, I, 44-45; II, 261.

15. NATOUSA GO No 13, 23 Feb 44; and No 19, 17 Mar 44.

16. Statement by Maj Sheppard of G-1 NATOUSA, 25 July 45.

17. NATOUSA GO No 44, 28 May 44.

18. History of the Replacement Command NATOUSA. Jun--Sep 44, p 1.

d. Changes in Personnel. The authorized personnel for G-1 NATOUSA in November 1943 and June 1944 are shown in the following table:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
Rank	Nov 43*	June 44 ⁷ / ₁₁	Rank	Nov 43*	June 44 ⁷ / ₁₁	Rank	Nov 43*	June 44 ⁷ / ₁₁
Gen &			CWO	1	1	M/Sgt	4	2
Col	5	5	WOJG	1	2	T/Sgt	8	2
Lt Col	6	5				S/Sgt	5	3
Maj	6	6				Tec 3	21	2
Capt	9	1				Sgt	6	2
1st Lt	8	1				Tec 4	40	4
						Cpl	10	2
						Tec 5	21	4
						Pfc	7	2
						Pvt	8	2
<hr/>			<hr/>			<hr/>		
Totals:	34	18		2	3		130	25
						Total Americans (1943):	166	
						Total Americans (1944):	46 ^x	

44. 19. NATOUSA GO No 13, 23 Feb 44, and No 19, 17 Mar

20. See History of AFHQ, II, 261.

* AG ltr to G-1 NATOUSA authorizing the allotment of personnel, 20 Sep 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 200.3-135 A-O).

2 AG ltr G-1 NATOUA authorizing the allotment
of personnel, 4 June 44 (AG AFHQ file: 221.02/467 A-O).

x The great decrease in personnel in G-1 NATOUSA in this period is largely accounted for by the transfer of the Publications Subsection including The Stars and Stripes.

3. Adjutant General Section (American) AFHQ--NATOUSA

a. The Adjutant General (A) AFHQ--NATOUSA. Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis (A) continued to serve as AG (A) AFHQ until 8 January 1944. He was succeeded by Colonel Harold V. Roberts (A) on that date. Colonel Roberts continued to serve concurrently as AG NATOUSA.

b. Modification of Functions of AG AFHQ-- NATOUSA.

The functions of AG AFHQ-- NATOUSA in 1944 combined those of the former separate sections of AG AFHQ and AG NATOUSA. In addition, with the establishment of the Analysis and Control Division in the AG Section NATOUSA on 12 February 1944, the following functions of the new American division were also assumed:

(6) To prepare for presentation to the (American) Theater Commander and his staff such summaries and analyses of statistical information as may be desired.

(7) To develop such special statistical projects as may be required or approved by the (American) Theater Commander or his staff.

(8) To make necessary contacts with staff sections for the purpose of securing information necessary for the compilation of such reports, analyses, and presentations as are desired by the (American) Theater Commander or his staff.

(9) To study the existing reporting system of the North African Theater of Operations (US Army) in order to ascertain over-lapping and duplicating reports which may be consolidated or eliminated.

(10) To submit recommendations for elimination, revision, or consolidation of reports to the (American) Theater Commander for approval.

(11) To make necessary contacts with commands and subordinate installations of the North

21. AFHQ GO No 2, 8 Jan 44.

22. NATOUSA GO No 21, 10 Apr 43.

23. See AR 15-5, 15 June 42, par 2. History of AFHQ, I, 29; II, 264-265, 268-269.

24. NATOUSA Adm Memo No 1, 12 Feb 44.

African Theater of Operations (US Army) in order to make recommendations to improve or correct the reporting system. Direct contact is authorized on statistical projects which have been approved by this headquarters.

c. Reorganization of AG (A) AFHQ--NATOUSA. The Analysis and Control Division was established in the Adjutant General Section NATOUSA on 12 February 1944.

The two sections, AG AFHQ and AG NATOUSA, continued to operate as separate sections until 23 February 1944 when they were combined into one section, AG AFHQ--NATOUSA. A complete organization and functional chart of the consolidated section was subsequently prepared and is shown on the next page.

d. Personnel of AG (A) AFHQ--NATOUSA. The authorized personnel for AG (A) AFHQ--NATOUSA in June 1944, compared with the combined authorized personnel of AG AFHQ and AG NATOUSA in November 1943, is shown in the following table:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
Rank	Nov 43*	Jun 44 ²⁶	Rank	Nov 43*	Jun 44 ²⁶	Rank	Nov 43*	Jun 44 ²⁶
Gen &			CWO	7	5	M/Sgt	14	8
Col	8	5	WOJG	10	9	T/Sgt	15	18
Lt Col	6	7				S/Sgt	16	20
Maj	16	12				Tec 3	15	20
Capt	25	17				Sgt	20	12
1st Lt	22	11				Tec 4	41	55
2d Lt	7	3				Cpl	19	14
						Tec 5	40	84
						Pfc	60	44
						Pvt	41	12
Totals:	84	55		17	14		281	287
							Total Americans (1943):	
							382	
							Total Americans (1944):	
							356	


25. Ibid.




26. NATOUSA GO No 13, 23 Feb 44.

* AG AFHQ authorized T/O of 25 Apr 43. AG memo on Allotment of Personnel to AG NATOUSA, 29 Sep 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 321-2-068).

† G-1 MTOUSA file: T/O AG AFHQ. AG ltr to AG AFHQ, 4 June 44 (AG AFHQ file: 221.02/446).

ORGANIZATION OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION AFHQ-NATOUISA
23 February 1944



LEGEND:
 Indicates a subdivision discontinued.
 Indicates a new subdivision.
 Indicates a subdivision in AG NATOUISA prior to 23 Feb 44.

4. Deputy Military Secretary (British)

a. Deputy Military Secretary (D/MS). Colonel A. E. V. Brummell (B) continued to be the Deputy Military Secretary at AFHQ and was promoted to the rank of brigadier on 21 January 1944.²⁷

b. Changes in Functions. The functions of the D/MS²⁸ at AFHQ remained in principle as they were in 1943. They were affected, however, by changes, which occurred in the Theater during the early part of 1944.

Since General Wilson, a British officer, succeeded General Eisenhower as the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean on 8 January 1944,²⁹ the D/MS, who previously acted as an advisor to the CAO in the latter's position as the senior British officer at AFHQ, therefore became an advisor³⁰ to the Allied C-in-C and not to the CAO.

Hq ACMF (later Hq AAI) was established on 26 February 1944, and General Alexander (B) as GOC-in-C ACMF was granted power to promote and make appointments up to the rank of brigadier in ITALY, SICILY, and SARDINIA.³¹ A D/MS was also included in the war establishment for his headquarters and was responsible for "military secretary" matters in the areas under the command of General Alexander,³² subject to the following restrictions:

- (1) Promotions and appointments to the

27. WO Auth, 6081 SD3c, 22 Jan 44.

28. History of AFHQ, II, 271-273.

29. AFHQ GO No 1, 8 Jan 44.

30. See footnote 28 above. FSR vol I, 13 Dec 39, sect 34.

31. Ltr, CofS AFHQ to GOC-in-C ACMF, 10 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 55/7).

32. Ibid., app A.

rank of brigadier in the case of arms and services which had a senior advisor or representative at AFHQ would be made by AFHQ in consultation with the GOC-in-C ACMF.

(2) Overriding authority on "military secretary" matters remained with SACMED at AFHQ who was to be advised of all changes in appointments of lieutenant colonels and above.

(3) AFHQ reserved the right of informing the GOC-in-C ACMF of British officers available and recommended for ACMF appointments.

(4) Publication of appointments and relinquishments of all British troops under the command of the GOC-in-C ACMF would continue to be made at AFHQ.

(5) Confidential reports in respect of colonels and above would be referred to the SACMED at AFHQ.

(6) Periodic awards would be submitted to the SACMED at AFHQ before they were forwarded to the War Office.

c. Changes in Organization. The internal organization of the office of the D/MS at AFHQ remained as it was in November 1943.³³ The D/MS, however, reported directly to the SACMED and not to the CAO after 8 January 1944.³⁴

33. History of AFHQ, II, 273. Statement by SSM Galloway, Chief Clerk D/MS AFHQ, 16 July 45.

34. FSR, vol I, 13 Dec 39, sect 34.

d. Changes in Personnel. A slight reduction was made in the authorized personnel of the Office of the D/MS at AFHQ when Hq ACMF was set up. A comparison of the personnel authorized for this branch at AFHQ on 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944 is shown in the table below:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>OTHER RANKS</u>		
Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44#	Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44#	Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44#
Brig		1	WO I	1	1	S/Sgt	2	1
Col	1		WO II	1	1	Cpl	3	2
Lt Col	1	1				Pte	11	9
Maj	2	1						
Capt	2	2						
Totals:	6	5		2	2		16	12

Total British (1943): 24
Total British (1944): 19

5. GHQ 2nd Echelon (British)

a. Deputy Adjutant General GHQ 2nd Echelon (DAG GHQ 2nd Echelon). Brigadier J. H. Woods (B) continued in this appointment throughout this period (December 1943 to July 1944).

b. Changes in Functions. One new function was added in this period to those which GHQ 2nd Echelon performed in 1943 when it was decided that GHQ 2nd Echelon would be responsible for the redirection of mail for Italian co-op-

35. Ltr, D/MS AFHQ to G-3 Org AFHQ, 28 July 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 251/Org 3).

* WE VIII/374/1, wef 1 Dec 43.

WE NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44.

36. History of AFHQ, II, 274-276.

erators and prisoners of war. The attachment of the necessary Italian personnel to compile and maintain a card-index system was authorized on 27 February 1944.

38

c. Changes in Organization. The organization of GHQ 2nd Echelon remained as it was shown in the chart at November 1943, but the following changes took place in the subsections:

(1) The Infantry Reinforcement Depot and

the General Reinforcement Depot were moved to

ITALY, and part of the GHQ 2nd Echelon Reinforce-

ment Section was transferred to that country early

in 1944 to deal with reinforcements problems.

This subsection was not an advanced echelon of

GHQ 2nd Echelon but remained part of the normal

40

organization.

(2) The redirection of mail for Italian

co-operators and prisoners of war was included

in the duties of the Italian Records Subsec-

41

tion on 27 February 1944.

(3) The employment of co-operators in

the Italian Records Subsection necessitated

the establishment of separate accommodations

for them. An Italian camp staff therefore

37. Ltr, DAG GHQ 2nd Echelon to G-3 AFHQ, 13 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 317/Org 3).

38. Ltr, G-1 (B) to GHQ 2nd Echelon, 27 Feb 44 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: 2170/A2).

39. History of AFHQ, II, 276-277.

40. Statement by DAG GHQ 2nd Echelon, 5 Mar 45. Ltr, DAG GHQ 2nd Echelon to G-3 AFHQ, 3 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 317/Org 3).

41. Statement by Capt Weston, Stats Sect, GHQ 2nd Echelon, 22 July 45.

was added to the administrative staff under

the command of the camp commandant, GHQ 2nd Echelon.

d. Changes in Personnel. The war establishment for GHQ 02E varied according to the number of individuals on their records. The basic figures for 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944 do not show, therefore, the true difference in personnel at those dates. The actual numbers at GHQ 2nd Echelon, including Italians, were as follows:

	Dec 43	Jun 44
Officers	43	92
Other Ranks & Civilians	1127	1994
Totals:	1170	2086

The basic war establishments are shown in the table below:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>OTHER RANKS</u>		
Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44 [#]	Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44 [#]	Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44 [#]
Brig	1	1	WO I	11	11	S/Sgt	35	36
Col	1	1	WO II	17	18	Sgt	160	160
Lt Col	5	5				Cpl	129	129
Maj	13	14				L/Cpl	5	5
Capt	29	29				Pte	467	493
Lt	6	7						
Totals:	55	57		28	29		796	823
Total British (1943):							879	
Total British and Italians(1944):							909	

42. Ltr, DAG GHQ 2nd Echelon to G-3 AFHQ, 13 May 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 317/Org 3). Amendt No 3 to WE NA/163/1, wef 5 June 44.

43. Figures supplied by Rfts Sect, GHQ 2nd Echelon, 22 July 45.

* WE III/2/3, wef 12 Aug 43.

[#] WE NA/163/1, with amendts No 1 to No 3, wef 5 June 44.

6. War Establishment Committee (British)

a. Chairman. Brigadier K.C. Cooper (B) continued in the position of Brigadier G-3 (Org) and therefore served as Chairman of the War Establishment Committee at AFHQ throughout the first half of 1944.

b. Changes in Functions. The functions of the War⁴⁴ Establishment Committee remained as they were in 1943, but its powers to authorize WEs were increased in the following manner:

(1) Authority to approve appointments in the rank of lieutenant colonel, as regimental commanding officers, was granted on 13 Decem-⁴⁵ber 1943.

(2) Unrestricted authority to approve the number⁴⁶ of vehicles in WEs was made on 13 December 1943.

(3) Authority to approve new WEs or to amend existing WEs for Polish units was granted on 11 January 1944. The limitations of the Committee in this respect were the same as those which applied to the approval of British⁴⁷ war establishments.

c. Changes in Procedure. Two changes took place⁴⁸ in the procedure of the Committee because of:

44. History of AFHQ, II, 279-281.

45. WO Cable No 97607 SD 3, WO to AFHQ, 11 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 210/Org 3).

46. Ibid.

47. WO Cable No 57350 SD 3 (D), WO to AFHQ, 11 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 210/Org 3).

48. Ltr. Whiteley to Walsh, 31 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 201 Whiteley).

(1) The large number of new establishments and amendments to existing establishments which were submitted to the Committee.

(2) The delays which occurred when proposals were sent from 15th Army Group (ACMF) in ITALY to AFHQ in NORTH AFRICA.

(3) The proposals were not always properly co-ordinated with the 8th Army and 15th Army Group (ACMF) authorities in ITALY before they were submitted to the Committee.

The two modifications which were made to obviate these difficulties were:

(1) Meetings of the Committee were held three times a week, instead of once a week,
49
with effect from 31 January 1944.

(2) A War Establishment Sub-Committee was constituted at Hq ACMF (AAI) on 3 March
50
1944.

The Sub-Committee was composed of representatives from the branches at Hq ACMF (AAI) which corresponded to
51
those of the main Committee at AFHQ and was given the
52
following duties:

(1) To investigate all new British WEs or amendments to existing WEs for use in this Theater with a view to advising the C-in-C ACMF in the exercise of the powers delegated to him.

49. Ltr, WEC AFHQ to all concerned, 23 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 210/Org 3).

50. Ltr, G-3 AFHQ to Hq ACMF, 3 Mar 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 210/Org 3).

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

(2) To examine in detail all proposed new WEs and amendments to existing WEs for use in ACMF with a view to economizing in manpower, equipment, and transport.

(3) To ensure that the gradings in the rank are in keeping with the duties and the responsibilities attached to them.

(4) To authorize, on behalf of the C-in-C ACMF, establishment or amendments to establishments or, if they were outside his powers, to recommend those which he should forward to AFHQ for approval.

The new WEs or amendments to existing WEs which were approved by the Sub-Committee within the powers delegated to the C-in-C ACMF (AAI) were forwarded to AFHQ to be
53
recorded.

Because of communication delays and the continuously changing factors in the British manpower situation in the Theater the War Establishment Committee found it exceedingly difficult to keep fully informed of the current
54
position. An officer was therefore appointed in G-3 (Org) AFHQ as Investigator of Manpower on 22 February
55 56
1944. The reasons for this appointment were:

(1) To keep all WEs under constant review by visits to headquarters, units, and establishments.

(2) To advise on the dilution of British units with Italian or other personnel.

(3) To advise lower formations on the preparation of WEs.

53. Ibid.

54. AFHQ Cable No 48746, AFHQ to WO, 7 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 210/Org 3).

55. Ibid. WO Cable No 71068 SD3 (c), 23 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 210/Org 3).

56. AFHQ Cable No 48746, AFHQ to WO, 7 Feb 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 210/Org 3).

Although he was not a member of the War Establishment
57
Committee, this officer acted as an advisor to it.

d. Personnel. The composition of the War Establishment Committee at AFHQ remained as it had been during 1943.
58

7. Headquarters Command (American) AFHQ--NATOUA

a. Headquarters Commandant (American). Colonel John W. Ramsey (A) continued to be Headquarters Commandant of AFHQ--NATOUA throughout 1944. His additional responsibility as Area Commander for American troops in the Algiers area was transferred to Center District MBS
59
by the end of March 1944.

b. Changes in Functions. The large number of new responsibilities given the Headquarters Commandant during 1943 had given him cause for concern as early as August of that year. At that time Colonel Ramsey stated:

In addition to the expansion in officers and enlisted men, many activities not contemplated at the time the original organization was set up in September 1942 have been added to the responsibility of this command. Among these activities are the following: general court-martial jurisdiction, command of the Algiers area, Rents and Leases Section, Quartermastering Section, and a Signal Service Regiment plus eleven (11) other signal units.

The original administrative organization

57. Statement by SQMS Reid, G-3 (Org B) AFHQ, 23 July 1945.

58. History of AFHQ, II, 282.

59. Statements of Col J. W. Ramsey, Hq Comdt AF, 11 Dec 44.

(of Hq Comd) was designed in such a manner as to have a central administrative group capable of handling all administration for the size headquarters as then planned. It has now become apparent that it is necessary to decentralize some of the administrative functions in order to handle efficiently the administration of the headquarters (AFHQ--NATOUA) as now constituted.⁶⁰

Despite these statements little was done during 1943 to distribute some of the numerous functions of Headquarters Command to other organizations. During October and November 1943 there was discussion of turning over a few Headquarters Command functions to Center District MBS in case of a physical separation of Headquarters NATOUA and AFHQ.⁶¹ However, when the move of AFHQ to ITALY failed to materialize during the winter of 1943--1944 a transfer of the Headquarters Command functions to another organization was not undertaken at that time.

The completion of a study on the functions and organization of Headquarters Command at the end of February 1944 started renewed consideration for the distribution of part of its functions to other agencies in NORTH AMERICA and ITALY.⁶² Of the different suggested solutions of the problem presented during March the one finally accepted by 26 March provided that Center District MBS would assume responsibility for "general service functions" for AFHQ and Hq NATOUA in the Algiers area.⁶³

60. Hq Comd AF memo to ACoFS G-1 NATOUA, 25 Aug 43 (AG AFHQ file: 322(AFHQ) Temp).

61. Ltr Hq CD MBS to CG MBS, 13 Oct 43 (AG AFHQ file: 322 AFHQ Temp). Ltr Hq Comd AF to CG NATOUA, 5 Nov 43 (AG AFHQ file: 322 AFHQ Temp).

62. Memo, Maj Easton of G-1 NATOUA to the ACoFS G-1, 25 Feb 44 (AG AFHQ file: 322 AFHQ Temp).

63. Ltr, Hq NATOUA to Hq Comdt AF, 26 Mar 44 (AG AFHQ file: 322 AFHQ Temp).

Upon the completion of the transfer of functions from the one organization to the other the duties of the Headquarters Commandant Allied Force reverted to those for which the office was originally intended,⁶⁴ while the "miscellaneous" responsibilities and "area" functions acquired during the 1943 period were passed on to Center District MBS.

Shortly thereafter the Visitors' Bureau was established under the control of the Headquarters Commandant⁶⁵ on 28 March 1944. The purpose of this new agency was to keep the SACMED and CG NATOUSA advised as to the status of all visitors located within their geographical areas of responsibility as well as to assist these visitors to accomplish their missions. In carrying this out, the Visitors' Bureau had the following specific responsibilities:⁶⁶

(1) To meet all visitors at ports of entry within the Algiers area and to provide the necessary accommodations for them.

(2) To formulate plans which would facilitate the accomplishment of visitors' missions and to arrange for courtesy calls when appropriate.

(3) To keep SGS AFHQ informed (on necessary details) concerning the arrival of distinguished visitors.

64. FM 101-5 pars 18 a and 27. See also History of AFHQ. I, 34-35; II, 283-284.

65. AG AFHQ ltr to CO Hq Comd AF, 28 Mar 44 (Visitors' Bureau, Hq Comd AF). AFHQ Staff Memo No 38, 2 Apr 44.

66. See footnote 65 above.

(4) To meet all officers and civilians with officer status who have recently been assigned to AFHQ or Hq NATOUSA and to offer them initial transportation and orientation services.

As a member of the Accommodation Control Committee (established to facilitate the move to CASERTA) the Headquarters Commandant had the following additional
67
functions to perform:

(1) To nominate administrative and clerical personnel to assist the new Committee.

(2) To provide the Committee with details on villas within the Caserta--Naples area for possible occupancy by general officers.

(3) To co-ordinate the demands for office space made to the Committee by British and American staff organizations.

c. Assigned and Attached Units. The decision to transfer some of the Headquarters Command functions to Center District MBS during March 1944 resulted by early April in a sharp decrease in the number of assigned or attached units of Headquarters Command. By 9 April, 19 assigned and 32 attached units were transferred from
68
Headquarters Command to Center District MBS, leaving Headquarters Command on 30 June 1944 with the following 10 assigned and 7 attached units made up of 3,384 offi-

67. AFHQ Staff Memo No 59, 15 June 45.

68. Hq Hq Comd AF GOs Nos 46 and 48, 4 and 9 Apr 44 respectively (filed at Hq Hq Comd AF).

cers and enlisted personnel:

Assigned Units

Hq Hq Comd, AF	6722d WAC Com Plat (Prov)
Hq Co, AF	2673d Hq Co, Censorship (Prov)
205th MP Co	2679th Hq Co, PWB (Prov)
2629th WAC Bn Hq (Prov)	6614th Com Censorship Co (Prov)
6666th WAC Hq Co (Prov)	
6667th WAC Hq Co (Prov)	

Attached Units

251st Sig Cons Co, 1 Det	985th Sig Serv Co
820th Sig Serv Co	2680th Hq Co, MIS (Prov)
850th Sig Serv Bn, Hq and Hq Co	6693 Sig Det (Prov)
2623d Sig Regt, Rear Ech Det	

e. Changes in Organization. With the substantial decrease in units and personnel assigned or attached to Headquarters Command during the first half of 1944 the following special staff sections of its headquarters were discontinued:

Staff Judge Advocate	Signal
Utilities	Chemical Warfare
Quartering	Surgeon
Chaplain	Special Service
Rents and Leases	

The Visitors' Bureau was added as a special staff section on 28 March 1944. The functions of a fire mar-

69. Consolidated Strength Report as of midnight, 30 June 44 (filed at Hq Hq Comd AF).

70. Statements of Lt Col Hillard and Capt Boyd of HAS Co AF, 9 Sep 45.

71. AG AFHQ ltr to CO Hq Comd AF, 28 Mar 44 (Visitors' Bureau, Hq Comd AF). AFHQ Staff Memo No 38, 2 Apr 44.

shal, which during 1943 had been performed by different special staff officers of Headquarters Command, continued to be handled in the same manner throughout the 1944 period.

The Special Troops and Security Command were discontinued as parts of Headquarters Command during April 1944. The signal troops, although depleted in numbers during this period, continued to be associated with Headquarters Command as attached units. A chart of the organization of Headquarters Command for the period ending in June 1944 appears on the next page.

f. Changes in Personnel. With the decrease in functions and the responsibility for many fewer units the personnel authorized for Hq Headquarters Command were likewise considerably reduced by 30 June 1944 from those of November of the previous year. A comparison between the authorized figures for these two periods appears below:

OFFICERS			ENTLISTED MEN		
Rank	Nov 43*	Jun 44 [#]	Rank	Nov 43*	Jun 44 [#]
Col	2	1	M/Sgt	4@	1
Lt	6	1	T/Sgt	6	2
Maj	8	2	S/Sgt	8)	3
Capt	10	3	Tec 3	6)	
1st Lt	6	1	Sgt	4	
Totals:	32	8	Tec 4	12	2
WARRANT OFFICERS			Cpl	4	
CWO	1		Tec 5	20	2
WOJG	2	1	Pfc	11	2
Totals:	3	1	Pvt	5	2
				80	14
Total Americans (1943):			115		
Total Americans (1944):			25		

72. Statement of Capt Cannon, Fire Marshal of Hq Comd AF, 14 Sep 45.

73. Statements of Lt Col Hillard, H&S Co AF, and of WO Okulick of Hq Hq Comd AF, 9 Sep 45.


74. Ibid.

* Ltr AG NATOUSA to CO Hq Comd AF, 8 Nov 43 (filed at Hq Hq Comd AF).

Ltr AG NATOUSA to Co Hq Comd AF, 13 May 44 (filed at G-1 MTOUSA).

@. Includes 1st Sgt as well.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF HEADQUARTERS COMMAND AFHQ-NATOUSA
30 June 1944



NOTE:

* On purely Hq NATOUSA matters, the channel of command came from the CofS NATOUSA to the Headquarters Commandant.

8. Camp Commandant's Office (British)

a. Camp Commandant. Lieutenant Colonel A. L. Gracie (B) continued to be the British Camp Commandant at AFHQ.

b. Changes in Functions. The duties of the Office of the Camp Commandant (British) at AFHQ remained as they were described for 1942 and 1943. 75

c. Changes in Organization. The following changes occurred in the organization of the Camp Commandant's office at AFHQ during this period:

(1) The large number of British personnel who messed at AFHQ and the dispersion of the various messes prevented the camp staff from superintending the rationing and messing activities with the thoroughness which they considered necessary. Authority was therefore given on 23 December 1943 for the appointment of a Catering Advisor on the Camp Commandant's staff to supervise all British messes at AFHQ. 76

(2) The work in connection with the billeting of British officers at AFHQ had been performed by a non-commissioned officer in the office of the Camp Commandant During 1943. 77 However, on 9 February 1944 a Billeting Officer was appointed in order to co-ordinate American and British billeting requirements. 78 This

75. History of AFHQ, I, 38-39; II, 292.

76. WEC AFHQ, Min of Mtg No 56, 23 Dec 43.

77. Statement by SQMS Major, Camp Comdt's office AFHQ, 25 July 45.

78. WEC AFHQ, Min of Mtg No 66, 9 Feb 44.

officer was on the staff of the British Camp Commandant but worked in very close association with American billeting authorities.

(3) In April 1944 the Bouzarea camp was released for the use of American personnel, but a small British contingent remained there throughout this period.

A Chart of the organization of the Camp Commandant's office at AFHQ in June 1944 is shown on the next page.

d. Changes in Personnel. The over-all increase in British personnel for the staff branches and services at AFHQ which occurred during the first half of 1944 necessitated additional staff to carry out administrative camp duties. A comparison of the personnel authorized for the administrative staff operating under the command of the Camp Commandant at AFHQ on 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944 is shown in the table below:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>OTHER RANKS</u>		
Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44#	Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44#	Rank	Dec 43*	Jun 44#
Lt Col	1	1	WO I	1	1	S/Sgt	1	1
Maj	1	1	WO II	3	3	Sgt	31	34
Capt	2	2				Cpl	19	23
Lt	2	4				L/Cpl	13	22
						Pte	327	563
Totals:	6	8		4	4		591	643
			Total British (1943):			601		
			Total British (1944):			655		


79. Statement by Lt Col Keen, Camp Comdt (B) AFHQ, 25 July 45.

80. Ibid.

* WE XII/1/4, wef 1 Dec 43.

WE NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE CAMP COMMANDANT'S OFFICE (BRITISH) AFHQ
June 1944



LEGEND:



Indicates an appointment which ceased during the period.



Indicates an appointment introduced during the period.

Chapter XXIV

INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATIONS

There were two principal changes in the intelligence staff organizations in AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA between 1 December 1943 and 30 June 1944. One was the establishment of the Allied Publications Board to control the civilian newspapers and radio news programs in the Theater; the other was the abolition of the separate G-2 Section NATOUSA when the American component in G-2 AFHQ was designated as the new G-2 NATOUSA. Other significant changes were: (1) the formation of several subcommittees under JIC, and (2) the establishment of branches of JICA at ROME and NAPLES. The details of these and of other minor modifications are related in the following sections of this chapter.

1. G-2 Section AFHQ--NATOUSA

a. Assistant Chiefs of Staff G-2 AFHQ--NATOUSA.

Brigadier K. W. D. Strong (B) continued to serve as ACofS G-2 AFHQ until 8 June 1944. He was promoted on 1 December 1943 to the rank of major general.¹ On 8 June 1944 General Strong was succeeded by Major General T. S. Airey (B).²

Colonel Theodore E.T. Haley (A) continued to serve as ACofS G-2 NATOUSA until 23 February 1944.³ He was

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1. WO Cable, 99582/MS 1, WO to AFHQ, 17 Dec 43.
 2. AFHQ GO No 16, 10 June 44.
 3. AG ltr to all concerned, 24 Feb 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 210.3/425 P).

succeeded by Colonel Thomas E. Roderick (A) who was also
the Deputy ACoFS G-2 AFHQ.⁴ Colonel Roderick was promoted to the rank of brigadier general on 21 February
1944.⁵

b. Changes in Functions. The functions of the G-2 Section AFHQ--NATOUA continued to be as defined by AR 10-15 and described in Parts I and II of this history,⁶ with the following modifications:

(1) The liaison functions of the Liaison and Library Section of the Operations Division were discontinued late in 1943, and only the library functions remained.⁷

(2) Liaison with the Italian Mission to AFHQ was also discontinued when the Allied Control Commission took over this function.⁸

With the union of AFHQ and GHQ MEF on 10 December 1943 for operations in the BALKANS, TURKEY, and HUNGARY, a definition of the division of responsibility for collation and distribution of intelligence was prepared. In general, the responsibility for ITALY, SOUTHERN FRANCE, GREATER GERMANY, ALBANIA, and JUGOSLAVIA was assumed by G-2 AFHQ, while the corresponding responsibility for GREECE, the AEGEAN, BULGARIA, TURKEY, ROUMANIA, and HUNGARY was retained by Intelligence Section GHQ MEF.⁹

4. NATOUA GO No 13, 23 Feb 44.

5. WD SO No 59, 9 Mar 44, par 2.

6. See AR 10-15, 13 July 42, par 8, and FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 15. See also History of AFHQ, I, 44-45; II, 296-297, 300-302.

7. Statement by Capt W. W. Leary (B) of G-2 Sect, 20 July 45.

8. Ibid.

9. AFHQ Int Instn No 34, 23 Dec 43.

Between 8 January 1944 and 28 February 1944 the G-2 Section NATOUSA had the responsibility for supervising the NATOUSA Historical Section which had the functions of administering the historical program of the US Army in the Theater and preparing such reports, histories, and special historical studies as were prescribed by the Theater Commander or the War Department.¹⁰

With the abolition of the separate G-2 Section NATOUSA on 23 February 1944 its functions, with the exception of censorship, were performed by the American component of the G-2 Section AFHQ.¹¹

US military and prisoner of war mail and news censorship continued to be under INC for general policy and co-ordination. For detailed control and direction these functions (except news censorship) were under the G-2 Section NATOUSA until 23 February 1944 when they were transferred to the G-2 Section SOS NATOUSA.¹² The functions of even the detailed control of US military and PW censorship were subsequently transferred from G-2 Section SOS NATOUSA to G-2 Section AFHQ--NATOUSA on 15 June 1944.¹³

c. Changes in the Organization of G-2 AFHQ--NATOUSA.

Late in 1943 the Liaison Section with the Italian Mission to AFHQ was eliminated. The Liaison Section of the Opera-

10. NATOUSA Staff Memos No 2, 8 Jan 44; No 9, 28 Feb 44. For detailed functions of the Historical Section see ch XXV below.

11. NATOUSA GO No 13, 23 Feb 44.

12. NATOUSA GO No 19, 17 Mar 44.

13. NATOUSA GO No 52, 10 June 44.

tional Intelligence Division of G-2 AFHQ--NATOUA was also abolished about this time, and the library part of the Section was expanded.

From 23 December 1943 a liaison detachment was provided by the Intelligence Section GHQ MEF for attachment to G-2 (CI) AFHQ to be under the control of G-2 (CI) and to deal with all matters concerned with projected operations in the AFHQ areas in SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, the AEGEAN, and TURKEY.

The most important change in the organization of G-2 AFHQ was the abolition of the separate G-2 Section NATOUA and the designation of the American component in the G-2 Section AFHQ as the new G-2 Section NATOUA on 23 February 1944. On 17 March 1944 the Censorship Section of G-2 NATOUA was transferred to HQ SOS NATOUA, but was returned to G-2 NATOUA again on 15 June 1944.

A chart of the integrated G-2 Section AFHQ--NATOUA, as it appeared in June 1944, is shown on the next page.

d. Changes in Personnel of G-2 AFHQ--NATOUA. The authorized personnel of the G-2 Section AFHQ and the separate G-2 Section NATOUA in November 1943, and of the joint G-2 Section AFHQ--NATOUA in June 1944 are shown in the following table. The figures for the G-2 Section NATOUA and of G-2 AFHQ in November 1943 have been com-

14. Statement by Capt W. W. Leary (B) of G-2 Sect, 20 July 45.

15. AFHQ Int Instn No 34, 23 Dec 44.


16. NATOUA GO No 13, 23 Feb 44.

17. NATOUA GO No 19, 17 Mar 44.

18. NATOUA GO No 52, 10 June 44.

19. Chart appended to memo, G-2 AFHQ to SGS AFHQ, 9 Aug 43. Statement of Capt W. W. Leary (B) of G-2 Sect, 20 July 45. NATOUA GO No 52, 10 Jun 44. AFHQ Int Instn No 34, 23 Dec 44.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-2 SECTION AFHQ-NATOUA
June 1944



LEGEND:

- [] Indicates units or sections controlled by G-2 AFHQ but not an organizational part of the Section.
- [X] Indicates a subdivision discontinued.
- (A), (B) Indicate that the entire subdivision is either American or British.
- (a), (b) Indicate a mixed subdivision with an American or British officer as head.
- * Under INC for general policy and co-ordination.

bined. A saving of twenty Americans was achieved by the abolition of the separate G-2 Section NATOUSA in 1944.

<u>OFFICERS</u>					<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>				
Rank	Am		Br		Rank	Am		Br	
	Nov 43*	Jun 44 [#]	Dec 43 ^x	Jun 44 [@]		Nov 43*	Jun 44 [#]	Dec 43 ^x	Jun 44 [@]
Gen & Col	4	2	2	4	M/Sgt	4	4		
Lt Col	6	4	5	6	T/Sgt	9	10		
Maj	12	14	12	11	S/Sgt	7	11	1	5
Capt	24	17	10	35	Tec 3	7	5		
1st Lt	9	12	20	16	Sgt	7	7	6	12
2d Lt	5				Tec 4	15	12		
					Cpl	3	3	12	19
Totals:	60	49	49	72	Tec 5	16	14		
					Pfc	15	17	7	16
					Pvt	8		8	11
<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>									
CWO	2	2	1	1					
WOJG	1		3	3					
Totals:	3	2	4	4		91	83	34	63

	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>
Total Americans:	154*	134
Total British :	87	139
COMBINED TOTALS:	241	273

2. Information and Censorship Section (INC) AFHQ

a. Chief of the INC Section. Colonel Arthur J.

McChrystal (A) continued as Chief of the INC Section throughout 1944. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier general on 9 March 1944.

* Memo, AG NATOUSA to G-2 AFHQ, 21 Aug 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 200.3-134). Memo, AG NATOUSA to G-2 NATOUSA, 26 Oct 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 200.3/134 A-O). These are the combined figures for the G-2 Sect AFHQ and the G-2 Sect NATOUSA.

[#] AG ltr to G-2 NATOUSA authorizing allotment of personnel, 16 June 44 (AG AFHQ file: 221.02/443 A-O).

x WE XII/1/4, wef 1 Dec 43 (AG AFHQ file: 321-1 AFHQ).

@ WE NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44.

20. WD SO No 59, 9 Mar 44.

b. Changes in Functions. Several modifications in the functions of the INC Section took place during 1944. With the subordination of GHQ MEF to AFHQ in December 1944 for operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, PWB AFHQ assumed supervision over the Political Warfare Executive Mideast. On the other hand, since PWB's North African Information Services became non-operational on the military side after the campaign moved across to ITALY, they were turned over to the diplomatic missions in ALGIERS. In April 1944, because INC in ALGIERS was too far away to supervise closely civil censorship in ITALY, operational control of the Civil Censorship Group Italy was transferred to ACC. All civil censorship policy matters, however, remained under the INC Section AFHQ.

c. Changes in Organization. The organization of the INC Section was modified in early 1944 by the inclusion of PWE Mideast and the loss of the North African Information Services. In addition, on 18 February 1944 the Censorship Branch of INC was divided into a Press and Radio Censorship Branch and a Communications Censorship Branch. The modified organization of the INC Section is shown in the chart on the next page.

21. Min of 4th Mtg SAC Political Committee, 28 Mar 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 337-4); ltr, AFHQ to CCS, 1 Apr 44 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O INC).

22. Min of 4th Mtg of SAC Political Committee, 28 Mar 44 (SGS AFHQ file: 337-4).


23. AG AFHQ Ltr Order 311.7-3-P, 24 Apr 44. Notes on basis of transfer to ACC in G-2 (CC) AFHQ file on Transfer to ACC.

24. Statement of Lt Col T. H. Finn, G-2 (CC) AFHQ on 25 July 45.

25. Chart of 25 Apr 44 in G-2 (CC) AFHQ file on Transfer of CC to G-2; AG AFHQ Ltr 321-1 (PWB) INC-AGM, 21 Feb 44 with chart atchd.

June 1974

Command



d. Changes in Personnel. A comparison of the authorized personnel of the INC Section in November 1943 and June 1944 is shown in the table below. The disparity between American and British personnel on the latter date is accounted for by the fact that American operating units in the field had their own T/Os, while all British INC personnel in the Theater were carried on the AFHQ WEs. The table also omits a substantial number of civilians in PWB.

OFFICERS					ENLISTED MEN				
Rank	Am		Br		Rank	Am		Br	
	Nov 43*	Jun 44#	Dec 43 ^x	Jun 44@		Nov 43*	Jun 44#	Dec 43 ^x	Jun 44@
Col & Gen	6	3	1	4	M/Sgt	4	1		
Lt Col	6	2	1	9	T/Sgt	8	5		
Maj	12	6	7	16	S/Sgt	6	4	1	
Capt	13	6	16	40	Tec 3	2	1		
1st Lt	16	6	6	25	Sgt	6	6	4	50
2d Lt		6			Tec 4	12	6		
Totals:	53	29	31	94	Cpl	3	1	10	48
					Tec 5 +	13	6		
					Pfc	23	21	8	24
					Pvt	13	13	58	155
WARRANT OFFICERS									
CWO		1	1						
WOJG	1			3					
Totals:	1	1	1	3					
					1943	1944			
					Total Americans:	144	94		
					Total British :	263#	374		
					COMBINED TOTALS:	407	468		

26. PWB activities in the Theater in Feb 44 employed 152 US civilians (from OWI), 71 British civilians (from PWE and Min of Information), and 1009 local civilians. Most of the last group were casual laborers and spot radio talent. (Cable No W-3993, AFHQ to WD, 1 Mar 44.)

* AG NATOUSA ltr to INC, 22 Nov 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 200.3-140).

AG NATOUSA memo to INC, 27 June 44 (AG NATOUSA file: 221.02-455 A-Q).

x WE XII/1/4, wef 1 Dec 43 (Censorship personnel); WE NA/195/1, wef 11 Nov 43 (No 2 Public Relations personnel). Since there was no WE for Br PWB personnel in Nov 43 (150 in all), they can only be shown in the totals at the bottom of the table. Over-all statistics from Capt G. B. Kaiser of PWB, 23 Mar 45.

@ WE NA/303/1, wef 12 Apr 44; WE NA/30/3, wef 28 Jan 44, amended to 30 June 44; WE NA/195/1 amended to 2 Feb 44.

3. Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) AFHQ

a. Chairmen of the JIC. Major General K. W. D. Strong (B), ACoFS G-2 AFHQ, continued to serve as Chairman of the JIC until 8 June 1944. On that date he was succeeded as Chairman by Major General T. S. Airey (B),²⁷ the new ACoFS G-2.

b. Changes in Functions. As restated in March 1944, the functions of the JIC AFHQ were:

(1) To keep under constant review the military and political situation in the area under the command of the SACMED through the intelligence agencies of the three services and through the political and economic members of the Committee itself. (It would not, however, be responsible for the supply of day-to-day intelligence.)²⁸

(2) To co-ordinate non-operational intelligence in the area under the command of the SACMED.²⁹

(3) To keep under constant review the general intelligence arrangements in the area under the command of the SACMED.³⁰

(4) To exercise general direction over the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center (CSDIC).³¹

27. AFHQ GO No 16, 10 June 44.

28. AFHQ Staff Memo No 29, 14 Mar 44.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Memo, G-2 AFHQ to CofS AFHQ, 4 Aug 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-3). Statement of Capt Leary (B) of G-2, 31 July 45.

The primary task of the JIC in carrying out these functions was the production of intelligence appreciations and notes dealing with the military situation. Since, however, it was seldom possible to separate military from political problems, the JIC was also called upon to produce politico-military and even purely political reports. It was the sole source of intelligence apprecia-³²tions for the JPS AFHQ.

In addition to the supervision of the Italian Sources Subcommittee established in 1943, the JIC during early 1944 assumed supervision over several other subcommittees which performed certain specialized functions. The functions of these subcommittees were:

(1) The Joint Intelligence Subcommittee³³
drafted the estimates and notes of the JIC.

(2) The Combined Services Enemy Supply Committee produced periodical reviews of the enemy supply situation or other enemy supply³⁴ papers as required.

(3) The Beach Committee prepared intelligence reports on coastlines and landing beaches and advised the JPS and force planning staffs on the suitability of these areas³⁵ for amphibious operations.

(4) The Interservice Combined Survey Committee revised and supplemented certain sections of the publications of the inter-

32. AFHQ Staff Memo No 29, 14 Mar 44.

33. AFHQ Int Instn No 37, 25 Apr 44, app A.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

Service Information Series, Military Intelligence Division (US), Office of Strategic Services, and similar intelligence agencies in Allied occupied territories in NORTH AFRICA.³⁶

(5) The Security Subcommittee discussed security problems of an interservice nature.³⁷

(6) The Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee selected enemy cities of intelligence interest, co-ordinated arrangements for securing information on intelligence objectives in those cities, and arranged for intelligence exploitation of them subsequent to capture.³⁸

c. Changes in Organization. Since it was seldom possible to separate completely the military from the political problems, the JIC AFHQ was expanded early in 1944 to include, in addition to the military, some political and economic representatives. After the reorganization the military representation from the three services remained the same and, on purely military matters, functioned as the Services Subcommittee.³⁹ On other matters (politics-military or purely political and economic) they joined in full Committee meetings with a British political member from the staff of the British Resident Minister, an American political member from the staff of the US Political Adviser, and one British or

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. JIC AFHQ Directive to Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee, 26 May 44 (JIC AFHQ file: /8).

39. AFHQ Int Insta No 37, 25 Apr 44, app A.

American economic representative.

With the subordination of GHQ MEF to AFHQ for operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, the JIC (ME) was placed under the JIC AFHQ for matters concerning operations in this area. JIC (ME) submitted its papers and estimates to JIC AFHQ which forwarded them with final comments to JIC (WASHINGTON) and JIC (LONDON).

41

As distinguished from the Services Subcommittee (which was an integral part of the main Committee) the following separately functioning subcommittees came under the supervision of JIC AFHQ in the first half of 1944:

Joint Intelligence Subcommittee
 Combined Services Enemy Supply Committee
 Beach Committee
 Interservice Combined Survey Committee
 Security Subcommittee
 Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee

The organization of the JIC AFHQ as it existed in May 1944 is shown by the chart on the following page.

d. Personnel. The three service members of the JIC AFHQ during the first half of 1944 were:


Major General K. W. D. Strong (B), ACofS G-2
 until 8 June 44; thereafter Major General
 T. S. Airey (B), ACofS G-2, (Chairmen).

40. AFHQ Staff Memo No 29, 14 Mar 44. Min of 1st Mtg of SAC Pol Com, 3 Feb 44, item 3 (SGS AFHQ file: 337-6 vol I).

41. Ltr, Strong to Slessor, 20 Feb 44 (G-2 AFHQ file: GBI/Exec/Org/2007). AFHQ Staff Memo No 29, 14 Mar 44, item 12.

42. AFHQ Int Instr No 37, 25 Apr 44, app A.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AFHQ
May 1944



LEGEND:

- New subcommittee in 1944
- Command and/or direction

X

Air Commodore F. Woolley (B), Chief Intelligence Officer MAAF.

Captain H. H. Bousfield (B), Chief of (Naval) Intelligence Staff, Mediterranean.

Other members for political and economic matters were:

Mr. E. V. Bowker (B) of the Office of the British Resident Minister.

Mr. G. F. Reinhardt (A) of the Office of the US Political Advisor.

Mr. R. H. Owen (B) of the Combined Economic Warfare Agency.

Major Michael Strachan (B), Secretary of the
43
JIC AFHQ.

4. Joint Army--Navy Intelligence Collection Agency (American) AFHQ

a. Chairman of JICA. Colonel Byron R. Switzer (A)
44
continued as Chairman of JICA at AFHQ throughout 1944.

b. Functions of JICA. The functions of JICA, which were primarily to furnish the War and Navy Departments and interested agencies of AFHQ with intelligence on military, political, and economic conditions in areas within the Theater,
45
remained the same during 1944 as in 1943. JICA maintained a direct fast courier service to the Joint Intelligence

43. Compiled from JIC estimates and bulletins during 1944 (G-3 AFHQ file: 43/4). Statement of Major R. N. Tandler (A), A-2 MAAF, 14 Sept 44.

44. Statement from Col B. R. Switzer of JICA, 12 Feb 45.

45. For an earlier statement of the functions of JICA (AFHQ) see History of AFHQ, II, 316.

Agency Reception Center⁴⁶ in WASHINGTON where the material collected was disseminated among the members (War, Navy, and State departments, Office of Strategic Services, and Board of Economic Warfare).

c. Changes in Organization of JICA. Two new branch offices of JICA were established: one in NAPLES in January 1944 and the other in ROME in June 1944.⁴⁷ The organization of JICA in June 1944 is shown by the chart on the following page.

d. Personnel of JICA. JICA was a joint agency of the American War and Navy departments, although attached to AFHQ and operating under the SACMED as a special agency of his headquarters. Hence JICA personnel were assigned to the War and Navy departments and were not carried on the T/O of AFHQ.⁴⁸ Personnel authorized for JICA by the War Department during the first half of 1944⁴⁹ remained the same as in November 1943.

5. Allied Publications Board

a. Activation. The Allied Publications Board AFHQ⁵⁰ was established on 11 December 1943.

b. Chairmen. Mr. H. M. Adams (A) of PWB was the

46. Ibid. Statement from Lt Comdr G. G. Schroeder USN, Chief of Naval Section JICA, 25 July 45.


47. Statement from Lt Comdr G. G. Schroeder USN (JICA), 25 July 45.

48. AG NATOUSA Ltr 200.3/134 A-O, 30 Nov 43. Cable No 6101, WD to NATOUSA, 31 Dec 43.

49. See History of AFHQ, II, 316-318, for JICA's personnel statistics.

50. AFHQ Adm Memo No 89, 11 Dec 43.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF JICA AFHQ
June 1944



LEGEND:

- Channels of information within JICA
- Channels of information outside of JICA
- New branches created in 1944

51
first chairman of the Allied Publications Board. He
was succeeded on 3 January 1944 by Mr. Hamilton Smith
52
(A) of PWB. Mr. George W. Edman (A) succeeded Mr.
Hamilton Smith on 1 March 1944 and continued as chairman
53
of the Allied Publications Board through June 1944.

c. Functions. The responsibilities of the Allied
54
Publications Board were:

(1) To grant and revoke licenses for
civilian newspapers, magazines, books, posters,
placards, brochures, and similar publications.

(2) To control the flow into ITALY, SAR-
DINIA, and SICILY of all newsprint and other
forms of paper used for printing publications
referred to in the preceding paragraph, to con-
trol and distribute all such paper found in
ITALY, SARDINIA, and SICILY, and to perform
such functions as were necessary to maintain
adequate paper supply.

(3) To control the allocation to spe-
cific publications and news organizations of
all such communications facilities as were
made available by the Chief Signal Officer AFHQ
for collecting and disseminating news and press
matter within ITALY.

51. Memo, G-2 AFHQ to G-2 (Adv Int) AFHQ, 17 Dec
43 (G-2 AFHQ file: GBI/190).

52. Min of 2d Mtg of the Allied Publications Board,
3 Jan 44.

53. Statement by Mr George W. Edman, chairman of
the Allied Publications Board, 21 Sep 45.

54. AFHQ Adm Memo No 24, 2 June 44, par 3.

(4) To direct the consolidation, movement, or rehabilitation of all equipment necessary for publication production.

(5) To enforce the directives of the various sections concerned with publication problems and to transmit the necessary censorship and policy directives to civilian publications for compliance.

(6) To report the activities of the Board and submit recommendations to AFHQ through the
55
Allied Control Commission.

The Stars and Stripes, Union Jack, Yank, and other
officially designated troop newspapers were specifically
exempt from the control and supervision of the Allied
Publications Board except for paper stocks, materials, and
facilities acquired in or derived from ITALY, SICILY, and
SARDINIA. The British and American army radio stations
56
were also exempt from the control or supervision of the Board.

d. Composition of the Allied Publications Board.

When the Allied Publications Board was established, it con-
57
sisted of representatives of the following organizations:

Psychological Warfare Branch (INC AFHQ)
(Chairman)

Censorship Branch (INC AFHQ)

55. AFHQ Adm Memo No 13, 14 Mar 44, sect II. Prior to 14 Mar 44 the Board reported and submitted recommendations to AFHQ through either AMG or ACC depending upon which of these organizations had jurisdiction.

56. AFHQ Adm Memo No 89, 11 Dec 43, par 4.

57. Ibid., par 1.

G-2 Section (AFHQ)

Allied Military Government (15th Army Group)

Allied Control Commission (AFHQ)

From the beginning of the Allied Publications Board two other organizations were represented whenever matters relating to them came before the Board. G-1 NATOUSA in conjunction with G-1 (British) was to designate a representative to sit as a member of the Board whenever a question involving any of the officially designated troop newspapers (e.g. The Stars and Stripes, Union Jack, Eighth Army News, and Yank) was to be discussed. The Survey Directorate AFHQ requested that the G-2 members also represent the Directorate.

Five changes in the composition of the Board occurred before July 1944. On 12 March 1944 Allied Military Government was dropped from membership on the Board, and the representation of the Allied Control Commission was increased to three (making a total of six members):

Psychological Warfare Branch Liaison

Officer with ACC

Representative of Political Section of ACC

Public Relations Officers (ACC)

On 2 June 1944 ACC's membership was increased by the addition of a representative from its Economic Section, and the PWB Liaison Officer with ACC became a representative of PWB AFHQ rather than of ACC. The Press Chief,

58. Ibid., par 2.

59. Ltr, Deputy Director of Survey AFHQ to G-2 AFHQ, 14 Dec 43 (Survey Directorate AFHQ file: CV 16/20)

60. AFHQ Adm Memo No 12, 12 Mar 44, sect I.

PWB ITALY, was also added to the representation of PWB
and became the executive secretary of the Allied Publi-
cations Board.⁶¹ Thus by June 1944 there were eight
regular members.

61. AFHQ Adm Memo No 24, 2 June 44, par 1.